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Civil-law systems for prosecuting crime, when viewed from across
the Atlantic, appear to offer an attractive alternative to several trouble-
some aspects of our criminal justice system.' Particularly appealing is
* Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law. The author would like to
thank Peter Quint, Bill Reynolds, and Mike Tonry for helpful comments on an earlier draft
of this article. The author spent the Fall, 1980, semester on sabbatical at the University of
Strasbourg, France.
1. American scholars who have cast admiring glances across the Atlantic include: L.
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the image of an impartial judiciary controlling the investigation, trial,
and .disposition of criminal charges. That picture compares favorably
with the prosecutor's dominant role in our system of bargained justice,
where the judge usually does little more than ratify the deal struck by
the parties. The principal excuse for this reliance on plea bargaining is
that because a party-dominated jury trial has become so time-consum-
ing a luxury, we can afford to provide it only to a small minority of
criminal defendants. For this reason, the prosecutor's discretionary
choices in matters of charge and sentence, and the defendant's willing-
ness to forego his trial rights in return for a more lenient sentence, typi-
cally determine a criminal case's disposition. If the Continentals avoid
dispensing unequal justice in this fashion through an efficient system of
judge-run trials, why should we not follow their example?
The debate in this country over the advantages of the continental
criminal justice systems so far has been inconclusive, due in part to a
lack of information about their actual functioning. For example, schol-
ars have debated whether judges do in fact exercise a dominant role.2
This article seeks to fill the information gap for one civil-law country
- France 3 - and to further the debate by evaluating that country's
criminal justice system by the criterion of the balance it achieves be-
tween individual rights and state authority.
Filling the information gap does not by itself resolve the debate
over the advantages of the civil-law approach, because the French ex-
perience demonstrates that the system's strengths and weaknesses tend
to balance each other out if evaluated solely in terms of the role within
the system of an impartial judiciary. The system's chief strength is the
efficient and generally fair4 trial afforded all defendants, based on a
comprehensive dossier which informs the judge in advance of all the
evidence in the case. Guilty pleas are not allowed except for minor
WEINREB, DENIAL OF JUSTICE: CRIMINAL PROCESS IN THE UNITED STATES (1977);
Langbein, A Land Without Plea Bargaining:- How the Germans Do It, 78 MICH. L. REV. 204
(1979); Schlesinger, Comparative Criminal Procedure. A Plea for Utilizing Foreign Experi-
ence, 26 BUFFALO L. REV. 361 (1977).
2. See, e.g., Goldstein & Marcus, The Myth of Judicial Supervision in Three "Inquisito-
rial" Systems.- France, Italy, and Germany, 87 YALE L.J. 240 (1977); Langbein & Weinreb,
Continental Criminal Procedure: "Myth "and Reality, 87 YALE L.J. 1549 (1978). For a recent
contribution to the debate, see Weigend, Continental Cures for American Ailments: European
Criminal Procedure as a Model for Law Reform, in 2 CRIME AND JUSTICE 381 (1980).
3. The best study in English on French criminal procedure is A. SHEEHAN, CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE IN SCOTLAND AND FRANCE (1975). For earlier studies, see Pugh, Administra-
tion of Criminal Justice in France. An Introductory Analysis, 23 LA. L. REV. 1 (1962); Vouin,
French Criminal Procedure, in THE ACCUSED: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 209 (1966).
4. French criminal trials are fair because they generally reach accurate results and also
because the defendant receives notice of the proceedings against him and an opportunity to
be heard in his own defense before an impartial tribunal.
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offenses punishable by a fine; all other criminal prosecutions in France
necessarily go to trial. The nonadversarial trial itself is usually an un-
complicated affair: The judges (most continental tribunals are colle-
gial) make a straightforward effort to ascertain the truth, and the only
trials likely to last longer than a day are those involving either multiple
defendants or a crime victim's claim for substantial civil damages.5
The system's principal weakness is that an individual's rights,
when confronted with the state's investigatory authority, are less sub-
stantial in France than in the United States. French prosecutors and
police exercise greater pre-trial investigatory and charging authority
than do their American counterparts; and that authority is not subject
to judicial supervision or other external checks. This weakness contrib-
utes to the system's chief strength, however, because the absence of sig-
nificant limitations on the pre-trial gathering of evidence by the
prosecutor and the police enables them efficiently to compile a compre-
hensive dossier.
The French criminal justice system thus presents a standoff be-
tween its principal weakness - domination of the investigatory and
charging stages by the police and the prosecutor - and its chief
strength - judicial control of the disposition of cases at trial. This
article seeks to resolve this standoff by evaluating the French criminal
justice system under the criterion of the balance it achieves between
individual rights and state authority. The French system does not com-
pare favorably with our own when evaluated under that standard.
Striking the necessary compromise between individual rights and
law enforcement needs is a central question for any criminal justice
system. How a society resolves that question affects not only the sys-
tem's efficiency but, more importantly, shapes the society itself. This is
because the rights at stake belong not just to the criminally accused but
to all persons confronted with the state's police power. The French
criminal justice system often responds quite differently than our own to
the competing claims of individual rights and state authority. Describ-
ing the French criminal justice system in terms of the compromise it
reaches allows us to determine whether we should emulate the French
as we attempt to improve our own criminal justice system.
This article also describes how the French criminal justice system
works and seeks to convey a sense of the issues that interest and divide
5. French law permits a crime victim either to join his civil action for damages with the
state-initiated prosecution or to initiate a prosecution himself if the state fails to do so. The
crime victim who exercises either of these options is called thepartie civile and becomes a
full-fledged party to the criminal proceeding. On the role of thepartie civile in the criminal
process, see infra note 52.
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criminal justice practitioners in France. Part I provides important
background information on the principal procedural characteristics of
a civil-law system for prosecuting crime and on the procedural pecu-
liarities of the French system. It also reports on the ongoing political
and philosophic debate in France over the approach society should
adopt to combat crime. This debate introduces Part II, which discusses
the investigatory and charging powers of the prosecutor and the police.
Part III of the article describes the individual's rights not only at trial
but also during the various pre-trial stages of the process. And finally,
Part IV focuses on how judges have implemented individual rights.
The article attempts throughout to compare the different ways French
and American law seek to limit the state's investigatory and charging
powers and to define and to protect individual rights.
I. THE FRENCH CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM - AN OVERVIEW
A. Basic Characteristics
Basic differences in procedural style between common-law and
civil-law systems reflect different ideas on how a trial court should de-
termine a defendant's guilt or innocence. The central idea behind the
common-law trial is that of a party contest; the idea behind a criminal
trial on the Continent is that of an official inquiry.6 The common-law
trial is the main act of a dispute between two theoretically equal parties
who enjoy considerable leeway to determine themselves, through
pleadings and stipulations, the limits and outcome of their dispute.
The adjudicator plays a largely passive, neutral role until the parties
ask him to render a decision. In most instances, the parties are able to
settle their dispute through an agreement which they expect the official
decider to ratify.
In a civil-law system, on the other hand, the trial culminates an
official inquiry whose object is to determine whether the defendant is
guilty and, if so, what sanction to impose. The court is responsible for
presenting the proofs and is not bound by the parties' positions when it
formulates the issues and reaches an ultimate decision. Trial proce-
dures in this nonadversary model are simpler, less technical, and less
lawyer dominated than in the adversary model where a complex system
of evidentiary and procedural rules governs the parties' judicial duel.
The hierarchical structure of continental criminal justice also dif-
6. For a fuller discussion of this distinction, see Damaska, Evidentiary Barriers to Con-
viction and Two Models of Criminal Procedure. A Comparative Study, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 506
(1973) [hereinafter cited as Damaska, Evideniary Barriers].
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fers from the common-law system's coordinate approach.7 The hierar-
chical model treats the official decider (policeman, prosecutor, judge,
etc.) as a technician who must apply clear legal directives to make ac-
curate determinations of fact subject to close supervision by higher offi-
cials. Certainty in reaching the correct result is the system's primary
goal, and it regards any leeway in official decisionmaking as at best a
necessary evil. By contrast, official deciders in a common-law system
enjoy more autonomy and view themselves more as problem solvers
than as legal technicians. Within the often flexible limits imposed by
the law, the decider's role is to render individualized justice.
These distinctions between the trial as an official inquiry and as a
party contest and between hierarchical and coordinate structures of au-
thority generally describe the basic differences between French and
American criminal procedure. Recently, the French have shown little
interest in adopting our approach, although they frequently complain
that their own criminal justice system is too complex, formal, and slow.
These inefficiencies result in part because their system often deviates
from the hierarchical model, despite the greater role in France of au-
thority in general and of the central government in particular.
Given the hierarchical model's theoretical importance, the lack of
cohesion among the French system's component parts is surprising.
The system divides along ideological, functional, and geographic lines.'
The ideological split separates the proponents of the repressive model
of crime control from the advocates of the rehabilitative model. The
functional split pits the police and the prosecutorial corps against the
new cadres of social workers and educators attached to the courts and
to the prison system. The latter groups favor the rehabilitative model,
and are more influential in urban than in rural France where the more
repressive approach of the police and prosecutor prevails. The geo-
graphic split distinguishes the informal, justice-of-the-peace style of
justice still prevailing in rural France from the formal, impersonal jus-
tice dispensed in more urban settings. As a result of these conflicts, the
Penal Code has lost its rigorous, determinative character. Especially in
urban areas where the substantive and sentencing provisions of the
largely nineteenth century Code no longer reflect community morality,
judges base their decisions less on law and more on their personal per-
ceptions of the need either to protect society or to help individual
7. See Damaska, Structures of Authority and Comparative Criminal Procedure, 84 YALE
L.J. 480 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Damaska, Structures ofAuthority].
8. See H. LAFONT & P. MEYER, JUSTICE EN MIETTES: ESSAI SUR LE DtSORDRE
JUDICIAIRE 15-27 (1979).
1983]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
defendants. 9
B. The Ideology of French Criminal Justice
French jurists' ° employ the termpolitique criminelle (loosely trans-
lated as ideology) to describe the legislature's overall approach or phi-
losophy in protecting society from antisocial behavior."' Reformers of
the French criminal justice system have focused on the theories under-
lying the system's response to crime, overlooking how its hierarchical
structure and official inquiry approach affect the achievement of their
goals. The Parliament's choice of the appropriate ideology thus has
tended to become a major political issue in France. The debate has
focused not only on the question of what to do with convicted offenders
but also on the proper balance between state authority and individual
rights.
The original Penal Code, enacted during the Napoleonic era,
adopted an approach (now labelled "classical") based on the twin prin-
ciples of legality and proportionality. The Code's draftsmen insisted
that it define all offenses and punishments and that the punishments
reflect the gravity of the offense. The new Code was thus a milestone in
criminal justice reform. By contributing to certainty in the law, it
helped to deter potential wrongdoers; by providing proportionality, it
permitted the rehabilitation of offenders guilty of less serious (i.e., non-
capital) offenses; and by defining offenses and punishments in advance,
the Code also prevented judicial arbitrariness.' 2
The nineteenth century produced a flowering of different schools
of criminology, but the original Penal Code's classical approach contin-
ued to dominate. It was not until well into the twentieth century (and
after the Liberation in particular) that a new ideology labelled La di'-
fense sociale nouvelle (New Social Defense) gained a clear ascendancy
among French jurists and secured major legislative changes.' 3 For its
9. See id. at 165.
10. The French use the word "jurist" (/urise) to cover not only professional judges but
also prosecutors, private attorneys (avocats), and law professors. Thus, a jurist is a person
learned in the law.
11. 1 R. MERLE & A. VITU, TRAITt DE DROIT CRIMINEL 96-97 (3d ed. 1978) [hereinafter
cited as I MERLE & VITU]; G. STEFANI & G. LEVASSEUR, DROIT PENAL GENERAL 22-24
(10th ed. 1978) [hereinafter cited as STEFANI & LEVASSEUR, DROIT PENAL]. These standard
treatises on criminal law describe how various politiques criminelles evolved in France. See
especially I MERLE & VITu at 98-144.
12. A desire to limit judicial power was one of the motivating factors behind the codifi-
cation movement. Parliamentary abuse ofjudicial power was commonplace in pre-Revolu-
tionary France.
13. The success of this movement in France is attributable in large part to the prestige
and eloquence of its leading spokesman, the Honorable Marc Ancel, the first president of
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principal tenet, this new school affirmed that society must protect itself
from antisocial behavior not simply by punishing wrongdoers but also
by rehabilitating them. Incarceration therefore should be reduced to
the minimum amount needed to incapacitate or to rehabilitate danger-
ous offenders; and the criminal justice system should develop medical,
educational, and social programs to reintegrate the offender into law-
abiding society. The linch-pin of this new approach thus was individu-
alized punishment. The court must judge the offender and not the of-
fense, and select the disposition best suited to accomplish the reformed
defendant's eventual reentry into society. To fulfill this responsibility,
the judges needed greater discretionary powers than the original Penal
Code allowed.
The French Parliament responded to the ascendancy of the New
Social Defense by promulgating, between 1945 and 1975, a half-dozen
or more major laws designed to protect society by rehabilitating offend-
ers. 4 These laws reorganized the juvenile justice system on exclusively
rehabilitative lines, instituted a pre-trial release system that both re-
duced the number of pre-trial detainees and provided immediate treat-
ment measures for those who were detained, and increased significantly
the availability of probation (especially supervised conditional proba-
tion). Parliament also created a new judicial officer 15 responsible for
supervising treatment programs for incarcerated defendants and for de-
ciding whether to grant a prisoner conditional early release on parole.
Parliament at the same time amended the Penal Code to increase
the trial court's discretion in selecting the appropriate punishment.
16
The original Penal Code of 1810 had rejected the principle, first
adopted in the Revolutionary Code of 1791, of a fixed punishment for
each offense. Instead, the 1810 Code's punishment provisions were
based on the principle of proportionality and required the court to se-
lect a punishment from a relatively narrow range of legislative choices.
This principle (i.e., that the punishment should reflect the gravity of the
the French Supreme Court (the Cour de cassalion). Ancel summarized its tenets in a lucid
bestseller (for a law book) entitled La defense sociale nouvelle, the first edition of which was
published in 1954. For an English translation, see M. ANCEL, SOCIAL DEFENSE: A MODERN
APPROACH TO CRIMINAL PROBLEMS (J. Wilson & M. Ancel trans. 1965).
14. For a description of these laws, see Lavasseur, Rformes rcentes en matiirep'nale
dues d /'&co/e de la defense sociale nouvelle, in 2 ASPECTS NOUVEAUX DE LA PENSEE
JURIDIQUE: RECUEIL D'tTUDES EN HOMMAGE A MARC ANCEL 35 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
2 MtLANGES ANCEL].
15. The new judicial officer was called the juge d'application des peines (judge of the
application of the punishment).
16. See Lavasseur, Reformes recenles en matirepenale dues I''cole de la dtfense sociale
nouvelle, in 2 MtLANGES ANCEL, supra note 14, at 50-51; 1 Merle & Vitu, supra note 11, at
944-47.
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offense), weakened by nineteenth century amendments to the Code that
permitted the court to reduce the minimum punishment by finding the
presence of extenuating circumstances, all but disappeared with the
post-World War II legislation. The Code as it stood prior to 1981 did
not require a court to impose an unsuspended prison term; for most
offenses, the court could choose any punishment between the author-
ized maximum and a five-franc fine.
Despite these legislative successes, the New Social Defense move-
ment failed to achieve one of its major goals: separating the guilt-deter-
mining process from the sentencing process."7 Under French law, the
same court judgment both determines the defendant's guilt and selects
the punishment. The court has no opportunity following its determina-
tion of the defendant's guilt to conduct the equivalent of a pre-sentence
investigation or to hold a separate hearing on the appropriate punish-
ment. This fusion of the guilt and punishment decisions is a major
obstacle to individualized sentencing. Proponents of the New Social
Defense advocate separating the defendant's conviction from the sen-
tencing process in order to permit the former to embody society's right-
eous condemnation of the offense and to shelter the latter from similar
retributive pressures. 18
During the early and mid-1970's, this failure seemed slight when
compared with the new ideology's successes in other areas. The move-
ment's proponents avidly awaited the triumph of their approach in the
promulgation of a new Penal Code to replace the often archaic Code of
1810. Throughout the 1970's, a government-appointed Commission of
jurists had been hard at work codifying anew the substantive and pun-
ishment provisions of the Code. The Commission's draft, which finally
appeared in 1976, adopted without reservation the individualized, re-
habilitative approach.' 9
17. On the importance of this goal, see Ancel, La cesure duprocspenal, in PROBLIkMES
CONTEMPORAINS DE PROCEDURE PEN4ALE: RECUEIL D'ETUDES EN HOMMAGE k Louis
HUGUENEY 205 (1964) [hereinafter cited MtLANGES HUGUENEY]. In 1975, Parliament en-
acted legislation permitting the court in certain cases involving relatively nonserious offenses
to delay or even to dispense with the imposition of a punishment. Roujou de Boubte,
L'ajournement et la dispense depeine, in MtLANGES DtDIE9 GABRIEL MARTY 955 (1978).
18. Ancel, La c'sure duprocspnal, in MtLANGES HUGUENEY, supra note 17, at 217.
In 1960, the adherents of the New Social Defense secured legislation authorizing (and for
the most serious offenses requiring) a pre-trial inquiry into the defendant's personality. This
information is available to the court at trial to aid in determining the appropriate punish-
ment. Although this inquiry provides the court with information relevant to punishment,
Ancel has argued that the inquiry's timing may prejudice the defendant's defense on the
merits. Id at 215.
19. See generally COMMISSION DE REVISION DU CODE PtNAL, AVANT-PROJET DEFINITIF
DU CODE PENAL: DISPOSITIONS GIENtRALES (1978).
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By 1980, everything had changed. That spring, the government
disavowed the Commission's draft on the grounds that its approach
was untimely given the need to repress crime more effectively. E°
Recodification of the Penal Code along the lines suggested by the Com-
mission became a dead issue in the Parliament. This turnabout, al-
though distressing to the advocates of the New Social Defense, did not
surprise them. Since 1977, penal legislation had reflected a new ideol-
ogy which sought to reduce the incidence of antisocial behavior by re-
pressing crime rather than by rehabilitating criminals. This new
approach emphasized more effective law enforcement, the deterrent ef-
fect of prison terms, and the need for longer prison terms to protect
law-abiding persons from violent offenders, particularly recidivists.E
The culmination of this wave of repressive legislation was the law
20. Le Monde, May 10, 1982, at I. Le Monde is the French equivalent of the New York
Times.
21. Among the repressive laws passed by Parliament were: a 1977 law (subsequently
declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Council) that expanded the police's powers
to search motor vehicles, a 1978 law that established a system of maximum security prisons
devoid of rehabilitative services, and a second 1978 law that required defendants convicted
of violent crimes to serve one-half of their sentence before they could obtain any form of
release from prison. In addition, the latter 1978 law limited the power of the supposedly lax
juges d'application despeines by transferring the initial release decision for most violent of-
fenders from that official to a three-man commission composed of a uge d'application des
peines, a prosecutor, and a prison warden.
Because the unconstitutional 1977 law did not go into effect, it has no official cita-
tion. In France, judicial review of legislation for constitutionality is restricted to a special
Constitutional Council (the Conseil constitutionnel), which functions as a court of revision.
For a description of the Conseil constitutionnel, see infra Part IV.E. For the provisions of the
1977 law and the decision of the Constitutional Council, see Judgment of Jan. 12, 1977, Con.
const., 1978 Dalloz-Sirey, Jurisprudence [D.S.Jur.] 1 173 note L. Hamon & J. Leautd. For a
discussion of this law, see infra text accompanying notes 212-13. For the two 1978 laws, see
Loi no. 78-788 du 28 juill. 1978, 1978 Dalloz-Sirey, Lbgislation [D.S.L.] II 346 and Loi no.
78-1097 du 22 nov. 1978, 1978 D.S.L. 11435. The former of these two laws merely ratified a
maximum security prison system that already existed. Judgment of May 4, 1979, Conseil
d'6tat, 1980 D.S. Jur. 1 433 note M. Drapier.
The American reader will find useful a brief description of the French reporting
system. The Recuei/ Dalloz-Sirey is an unofficial reporter which publishes in its case law or
Jurisprudence section a selection of decisions by the various French courts. French cases are
normally cited by the name of the court and the date of the decision rather than by the
names of the parties. This reporter also includes case notes and articles on legal topics by
leading French jurists. The case notes accompany the text of the decisions while the articles
appear in a separate section designated Doctrine or Chronique. Dalloz-Sirey also has a Lig-
islation section containing the texts of statutes and decrees. Its chief competitor, Juris-Clas-
seurpbriodique, la semainejuridique (J.C.P.), has a similar format.
The highest court in the regular court system is the Cour de cassation or Supreme
Court. The various Chambers of that court render over 14,000 decisions per year. The great
majority of the decisions are not published and are of interest only to the parties. The
academic commentators, however, annually select several hundred decisions for publication
in the unofficial reporters. These commentators usually determine a particular decision's
1983]
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"Security and Liberty" 22 proposed by the rightist government of former
Prime Minister Raymond Barre23 in the late spring of 1980. Despite
the bitter and public opposition of many jurists (including sitting
judges), the Parliament adopted this highly controversial law in modi-
fied form at the end of the year and the President promulgated it in
early 198 1.24 The vote in Parliament was largely along party lines: the
rightist majority supported the government, while the Socialist and
Communist opposition voted against it. The new law reduced the
court's discretion in determining the punishment to impose upon vio-
lent offenders in three ways. First, the legislature established floors
(olanchers) that defined mandatory minimum prison terms. Second,
the Parliament sharply restricted the availability of probation, and
third, the new law required the court to impose still more severe pun-
ishments on a broadened category of recidivists. The new law's
message was plain: the solution to the crime problem is prison. Longer,
more certain prison terms are needed to deter potential criminals and
to incapacitate actual ones.
The reasons for this about-face in ideology are not easy to deter-
mine. French crime statistics are not particularly informative, but most
French experts on this subject believe that the 1970's did not witness
any major increase in violent crime and that there was even a decline in
1979.25 According to these experts, the long-term rise in the number of
importance on the basis of the novelty of the issue and the strength of the court's reasoning.
The court itself publishes roughly twenty percent of its decisions in its official Bulletins.
The Conseil d'etat is France's highest administrative court. In France, a separate
system of administrative courts has exclusive jurisdiction over most noncriminal litigation
involving the state or its instrumentalities. Citations to the decisions of the Conseil d''tat
normally include the names of the private parties.
22. Loi no. 81-82 du 2 f~v. 1981, 1981 D.S.L. II 86. For an analysis of the law's provi-
sions, see Pradel, La /0i du 2fevrier 1981 dite "Skurite et Libert" et ses dispositions de
procedurep'nale, 1981 D.S. Chronique 1 101.
23. Raymond Barre, prime minister from 1976 to May, 1981, was the last prime minister
to serve under former President Giscard d'Estaing. He resigned after the presidential elec-
tion of May 10, 1981, in which the Socialist candidate Franqois Mitterrand defeated Giscard
in his bid for a second term.
24. Although both houses of Parliament passed the law in December, 1980, the Presi-
dent did not promulgate it until February 2, 1981, because the law's opponents challenged
its constitutionality before the Constitutional Council. The Council upheld the constitution-
ality of all but four minor sections of the law. Judgment of Jan. 19-20, 1981, Con. const.
For the text of this decision and critical commentary, see Philip, La decision securite et Aiberte
des 19 et 20janvier 1981, 1981 REVUE DU DROIT PUBLIC ET DE LA SYSTEME POLITIQUE EN
FRANCE ET A L'tTRANGER [R.D.P.] 651. The Revue du droft public is the leading French
journal on constitutional and administrative law.
25. See P. Boucher, LeMonde, May 27, 1980, at 10 (views of experts within Ministry of
Justice); Le Clere, Chroniquepolicologique, 1979 REVUE ADMINISTRATIF 451 (analysis of
police crime statistics). The Revue administratif is one of the leading French journals on
administrative law.
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crimes in the statistics compiled by the police and the Ministry of Jus-
tice is largely explainable in terms of more effective law enforcement.
There is no question, however, that in the late 1970's the French felt
more insecure about the threat of violent crime than they had in the
recent past and that Prime Minister Raymond Barre's government ag-
gravated this sense of insecurity by publicly recognizing that it was well
founded and by basing the government's legislative program on the
need to alleviate it.
The success of the new repressive ideology may be short lived.
The Socialist Fransqois Mitterrand defeated the incumbent Giscard
d'Estaing in the May, 1981, presidential election, and the Socialist
Party won control of the National Assembly in the legislative elections
that followed. Although economic issues dominated both campaigns,
the Socialists attacked the law "Security and Liberty" and promised to
secure its repeal. After a year and a half of vacillation, the Socialist
government of Prime Minister Pierre Mauroy finally introduced legis-
lation to repeal part of the law. That legislation is likely to pass the
Socialist Parliament during 1983. It is uncertain at this point whether
the Socialists will go further in reviving the rehabilitative approach by
enacting a new Penal Code or other reform legislation.
This brief description of the political and legislative struggle in
France between competing ideologies for combatting crime indicates
that the debate has not considered the implications of either the official
inquiry model for prosecuting crime or the hierarchical model for or-
ganizing official deciders within the criminal justice system. A central
issue in that debate is very similar to one of the central criminal justice
issues in this country: how to achieve a proper balance in investigating
and prosecuting offenses between society's interest in repressing crime
and the individual's interest in his own personal liberty. Resolving that
issue is no easier in France than in the United States and may actually
be more difficult because of the fragmented nature of the French crimi-
nal justice system. Although it may seem paradoxical that a system
based on the official inquiry and hierarchical models should encounter
difficulties in resolving policy issues and implementing the decisions
reached, these phenomena are more understandable given the func-
tional and geographic dichotomies within the system and the tripartite
jurisdictional structure for trying offenses described below. It is diffi-
cult to formulate or implement a cohesive policy when so many differ-
ent units are involved and no one unit has ultimate control.
C. The Categories of Offenses
The most visible cleavage within the French criminal justice sys-
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tern is the jurisdictional division of offenses into three categories of de-
scending gravity (crimes, dislits, and contraventions) and the
establishment of separate court systems, each governed by its own set
-of procedural provisions, for trying cases in each category. An under-
standing of this division is essential because an offense's category often
determines the authority of the prosecutor and the police as well as the
rights of the individual.
The tripartite division dates from the Napoleonic Codes, the Penal
Code of 18 10, and the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1808.26 Today in
France, as during the First Empire, each of the country's ninety-odd
departments has a cour d'assises to try defendants charged with the
most serious offenses (crimes),27 a tribunal correctionnel to try defend-
ants charged with middle-range offenses (d'lits),28 and usually at least
five or six tribunaux depolice to try defendants charged with the least
serious offenses (contraventions).29 The following chart depicts the tri-
partite jurisdictional structure:
26. The Penal Code (Codepbnal) is still in force today. Although amendments in the
intervening years have greatly changed its punishment provisions, its substantive definitions
and categories of offenses have remained largely unchanged. In 1958, a new Code of Crimi-
nal Procedure (Code deprocedurepnale) replaced the Napoleonic Code, but the new Code
did not change the tripartite structure for the trial of offenses. The Napoleonic Code was
called the Code d'instruction criminelle. For purposes of this article, both of the procedural
Codes are referred to as Codes of Criminal Procedure.
27. The category of a particular offense normally is determined by the accompanying
punishment provision. For example, an offense is a crime if it is punishable either by life
imprisonment or by a term of years when that punishment is designated as a dtention or
rtclusion criminelle. CODE PENAL [C. PtN.] arts. 1, 6-8 (79e ed. Petits Codes Dalloz
1981-82). Normally, an offense will be designated a crime if the court may impose a prison
term exceeding five years. Certain crimes were also punishable by death prior to the aboli-
tion of capital punishment in 1981.
28. An offense is a delit if it is punishable by a prison term (emprisonnement) in excess of
two months or a fine in excess of 6000 francs. CODE DE PROCIDURE PtNALE [C. PR. PtN.]
ART. 381 (23e ed. Petits Codes Dalloz 1981-82). Traditionally, the legislature authorized a
maximum prison term of no more than five years for a dtlit, but the legislature may exceed
that limit by labeling the punishment an emprisonnement and not a detention or reclusion
criminelle. The legislature has done this frequently in recent years, particularly for recidi-
vists. As a result, a tribunal correctionnel may impose a prison term of ten or even twenty
years in some circumstances. The legal distinction between emprisonnement and detention or
rclusion criminelle does not directly affect the housing of prisoners, which at present is an
administrative matter.
29. An offense is a contravention if it is punishable by a prison term of two months or
less or a fine of 6000 francs or less. C. PR. PaN. ART. 521 (23e ed. Petits Codes Dalloz
1981-82). A tribunal depolice may not impose a punishment in excess of those limits.
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TRIAL COURT TYPE OF OFFENSE AUTHORIZED PUNISHMENT
Cour d'assises Crime Death (prior to the
abolition of capital
punishment in 1981), life
imprisonment, or a prison
term in excess of five
years.
Tribunal D1'lit A prison term in excess of
correctionnel two months but not in
excess of five years,
or a fine in excess of 6000
francs.
Tribunal de police Contravention A prison term of two
months or less, or a fine
of 6000 francs or less.
Each court system has its own ambiance and rhythm which is even
more apparent to the observer than the . Code suggests. In a cour
d'assises, a mixed panel of three professional judges and nine lay jurors
determines both the defendant's guilt or innocence and the appropriate
punishment. The formality and solemnity of the procedure reflect the
seriousness of the charge, and the procedure follows a ritual that varies
little from one case to the next. After impaneling the lay jurors and
reading the charging document, the president of the court examines the
defendant on his curriculum vitae or personality and on the merits of
the charge. The president then calls the witnesses whom the parties
have designated in advance.3" Unlike the defendant, the witnesses give
their depositions under oath and are questioned by the president only
after they have described what they know about the defendant or the
charges against him. The prosecutor, defense counsel, counsel for the
crime victim,3' and the members of the mixed panel may request the
president to address additional questions to a witness. The president
almost always obliges and sometimes allows the interrogator to pose
the question directly to the witness. The number of questions proposed
by the other participants is usually quite limited, however, and the
president plainly dominates the courtroom proceeding.32 Following
30. The president has the discretionary authority to designate additional witnesses on
his own initiative. Unless the parties consent, these witnesses do not testify under oath. C.
PR. PEN. art. 336 (23e ed. Petits Codes Dalloz 1981-82).
31. On the role in the criminal process of the crime victim orpartie cipile, see infra note
52.
32. Most presidents do not encourage questions from other panel members. After the
testimony of each witness, the president asks the prosecutor, the counsel for thepartie civile,
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the president's presentation of the proof, the prosecutor, counsel for the
crime victim, and defense counsel make their oral pleadings, emerging
for a brief while from their subordinate roles to display the verbal
eloquence for which French advocates are so well known. The mixed
panel of twelve members then withdraws to deliberate together to reach
a decision; at least eight panel members (none of whom need be
professional judges) must agree for the panel to make a determination
adverse to the defendant.
The trial of a dblit before a three-judge panel in a tribunal
correctionnel lacks the same ritual. The procedure flows less smoothly
and the participants are more harried because they realize the
courtroom is overflowing with counsel, witnesses, or even defendants
for other cases that are scheduled for trial the same day.33 The dossier
before the president is less likely to contain a complete account of the
alleged offense than a dossier before a cour d'assises, which will
necessarily have been prepared by an examining magistrate.34
Counsel, the parties, and witnesses often interrupt the regular order of
the proceeding in an effort to determine what actually did occur. The
president's examination of the defendant plays a crucial role because
instead of calling the prosecutor's witnesses to give oral testimony, the
president often summarizes their prior statements contained in the
dossier. Any witnesses that the president does examine are most likely
those designated by the defendant under a Code provision allowing
him to do so simply by presenting the witnesses to the court on the day
of trial.35 In all but the simplest cases, the court usually adjourns to
announce its decision at a future date because its written judgment
must contain findings of fact and applications of law. The judgment is
a formal, elaborate, reasoned document contrasting sharply with the
unexplained judgment of the cour d'assises.
The trial of a contravention before a tribunal depolice resembles in
many respects the trial of a dklit before a tribunal correctionnel. The
principal differences are the presence of a single judge rather than a
three-judge panel and the need for even greater haste in disposing of
cases. In addition, the Code explicitly provides that the police reports
in the dossier are presumed true absent proof to the contrary.36 The
and defense counsel whether they have any questions for the witness. The president
normally does not direct a similar inquiry to other members of the panel.
33. Trials in a cour d'assises traditionally open at 9:00 A.M. If the trial finishes in mid-
day, the court has a free afternoon as a second trial is never scheduled for the same day.
34. For the role of the examining magistrate, see infra text accompanying notes 58-73.
35. C. PR. PEN. art. 444 (23e ed. Petits Codes Dalloz 1981-82).
36. C. PR. PEN. art. 537 (23e ed. Petits Codes Dalloz 1981-82). This article covers
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operation of this presumption obviates the need in most cases for the
prosecution's witnesses to appear at trial. The judge simply informs the
defendant of the proof against him in the dossier and affords him an
opportunity to respond.
The overwhelming majority of cases in the tribunaux de police,
however, do not go to trial but are disposed of through the simplified
procedure of the ordonnancepbnale.37 The prosecutor implements this
procedure by transmitting to the court the dossier of a proceeding along
with his request for a particular disposition. After examining the
dossier, the court may either acquit the defendant, send the defendant's
case to trial, or draft a judgment (the ordonnancepbnale) convicting the
defendant of an offense and assigning a particular fine as a punishment.
If the punishment differs from that requested by the prosecutor, he may
oppose the judgment. Otherwise, the defendant may terminate the
prosecution by paying the sum requested or may himself oppose the
judgment and go to trial. Few prosecutors and even fewer defendants
choose to go to trial. The principal benefit gained by the defendant
who pays the fine is that he is spared the bother of a day in court. The
prosecutor plays a dominant role in instituting this simplified
procedure and in recommending a particular punishment, but the
statutory provision restricting its use to cases where the punishment
imposed is a fine38 sharply limits the scope of the prosecutor's power.
Many prosecutor's offices invoke this simplified procedure as a matter
of bureaucratic routine to prosecute common petty offenses like
shoplifting and uttering bad checks.39 This practice is not analogous to
plea bargaining because the prosecutor acts unilaterally and because
the defendant who asserts his right to trial is unlikely to receive a
harsher sentence than that proposed in the ordonnance p'nale. 4
primarily the proces verbaux prepared by the officiers de la police judiciaire. See infra text
accompanying note 85.
37. For the statutory provisions on the ordonnancepbnale, see C. PR. PEN. arts. 524 to
528-2 (23e ed. Petits Codes Dalloz 1981-82). The prosecutor's suggestion of a specific
punishment is not unusual. All three court systems permit, and the cours d'assises expect,
the prosecutor to request a specific punishment in his oral pleading to the court.
38. C. PR. PtN. art. 525 (23e ed. Petits Code Dalloz 1981-82).
39. For most traffic offenses, the procedure is even simpler. The court need not draft an
ordonnance, and the defendant who has received a traffic ticket may terminate the
prosecution by paying a set fine. 2 R. MERLE & A. VITu, TRAITE DE DROIT CRIMINEL
754-55 (3d ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as 2 MERLE & VITU].
40. French scholars have not addressed these issues in published sources. The author
discovered no evidence of bargaining between defense counsel and the prosecutor before the
latter's initiation of the simplified procedure. The absence of any concern over differential
punishment provides strong evidence that such a practice has not developed.
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II. THE INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION OF
OFFENSES IN FRANCE
In France today, the prosecutor dominates both the investigation
and the prosecution of offenses. The Code of Criminal Procedure orig-
inally was designed to prevent any single official from dominating the
criminal process by dividing authority among three offices: the prose-
cutor, the examining magistrate, and the trial judge. This separation of
functions proved to be too cumbersome at the pre-trial stage of the
process, and prosecutors found ways to circumvent it. That develop-
ment may have resulted in more efficient law enforcement, but it also
has diluted individual rights. Efforts to limit the prosecutor's powers
have been largely ineffective.
A. The Office of the Prosecutor
The public prosecution of offenses in France is the responsibility
of professional prosecutors who, unlike their American counterparts,
make a lifetime career in the prosecutorial corps. The prosecutorial
corps is in theory a judicial one; prosecutors are magistrates4' separate
and distinct from the private bar of avocats. In the courtroom, French
prosecutors are less adversarial than American ones.42 They view their
role as one of aiding the court to determine the truth and they strive to
distinguish themselves from the more partisan avocats who are seeking
to protect the interests of a client. Prosecutors, however, enjoy less in-
dependence and prestige than judges. They do not share the same pro-
tection from removal afforded French judges, and their written
presentations to the court must conform to the instructions of their hi-
erarchical superiors. 3 Outside the courtroom, their designation as
magistrates is even less significant, and they are in fact career civil ser-
vants within the Ministry of Justice.
Prosecutorial supervision of the police is quite intensive by Ameri-
can standards. The Code of Criminal Procedure places the police's in-
41. The distinction is often made between the magistrats debouts - the prosecutors who
stand while pleading in court - and the magistrats assis - the judges who sit. In a French
courtroom, the prosecutor's table is at the same level as the judges' bench and above the
table reserved for the lawyers for the private parties (avocats). J. CHAZAL, LES MAGISTRATS
61-62 (1978).
42. Vouin, The Role of the Prosecutor in French Criminal Trials, 18 AM. J. COMP. L. 483,
492 (1970).
43. When addressing the court orally, an individual prosecutor may express his own
personal convictions, even though they are contrary to his superior's instructions and to the
written submissions of his office. 2 MERLE & VITU, supra note 39, at 246-47. Prosecutors
rarely exercise this liberty, however.
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vestigatory activity under the direction of the local prosecutor;44 and in
actual practice, the French prosecutor works more closely with the po-
lice than does his American counterpart, particularly during the early
stages of an investigation. In addition, the Code requires the police to
inform the prosecutor promptly of any offenses known to them and to
forward to him the dossier they prepare during the course of their in-
vestigation.45 Members of the prosecutor's office normally arrive at the
scene of a serious offense soon after the police. In such cases, the Code
of Criminal Procedure explicitly confers on the prosecutor the investi-
gatory powers of a police officer and authorizes him to direct the
investigation.46
French prosecutors have broad discretionary powers to initiate a
prosecution on behalf of the state and thus differ from prosecutors in
West Germany and other continental countries who are subject to
mandatory prosecution provisions for the most serious offenses.47
More important, the prosecutor's statutory authority48 to decide
whether to initiate a prosecution is exercised by him and not by the
police. Except for the most minor or straightforward matters, the clos-
ing of a police investigation without the initiation of a prosecution is a
prosecutorial and not, as is often the case in this country, a police
decision.
B. Limitations on Prosecutorial Power
Both French and American law seek to limit the investigatory and
charging power of the prosecutor and the police, but the two systems
approach the same task in strikingly different ways. In the United
States, the applicable limitations take two principal forms, both of
which are intended to protect the individual from the abuse of govern-
mental authority. The first type of limitation is a screening device
which checks the prosecutor's charging authority by requiring him to
obtain the approval of a supposedly independent body before he may
bring a defendant to trial on felony or other serious charges. The most
common screening devices in this country are the grand jury and the
preliminary hearing.
The second type of limitation in America explicitly sets forth indi-
44. C. PR. PtN. art. 12 (23e ed. Petits Codes Dalloz 1981-82). The chief prosecutor in
each department is the procureur de la republique.
45. C. PR. PEN. art. 19 (23e ed. Petits Codes Dalloz 1981-82). In practice, most prosecu-
tors do not insist that the police observe these formalities with respect to minor offenses.
46. C. PR. PtN. art. 68 (23e ed. Petits Codes Dalloz 1981-82).
47. See Weigend, Sentencing in West Germany, 42 MD. L. REV. 37 (1982).
48. C. PR. PeN art. 40 (23e ed. Petits Codes Dalloz 1981-82).
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vidual rights which the prosecutor and the police must respect when
investigating and prosecuting offenses. The most important examples
are federal and state constitutional provisions recognizing the rights of
all persons to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures and
compelled self-incrimination. Courts have enforced these provisions
by barring the prosecution from using at a criminal trial evidence ob-
tained in violation of the defendant's constitutional rights.49 In addi-
tion, statutes that define individual rights, such as the right of privacy,
may explicitly restrict the investigatory activity of law enforcement offi-
cials, and may overlap and even may exceed constitutional restric-
tions." Federal and state statutory provisions defining and punishing
crimes such as burglary, trespass, and assault also restrict the investiga-
tion and prosecution of crime, because they normally apply to the con-
duct of law enforcement officials as well as to that of private persons.5'
The French legal system takes the opposite approach to limiting
the investigatory and charging powers of the prosecutor and of the po-
lice acting under him. Although screening devices play a role, 2 French
lawmakers primarily have sought to limit the prosecutor's power by
49. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (evidence seized in violation of
federal Constitution inadmissible in state as well as federal criminal trials); Miranda v. Ari-
zona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (same for evidence obtained in violation of federal constitu-
tional privilege against self-incrimination).
50. See, e.g., § 101(b) of The Privacy Protection Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa (Supp.
IV 1980), which rendered unlawful third party document searches which had been constitu-
tionally permissible under Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 554 (1978).
51. See, e.g., Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379, 382 (1937) (Communications Act
of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1976)).
52. For a discussion of the check on the prosecutor's decision to prosecute provided by
the examining magistrate, see infra text accompanying notes 64-67.
One important check on the French prosecutor's discretion not to bring charges that
has no counterpart in this country is the crime victim's right to initiate a criminal prosecu-
tion by becoming apartie civile in the criminal court. In this way, he may obtain both the
defendant's conviction and compensatory damages for himself. Because the court may or-
der apartie civile to pay money damages to the defendant and a substantial fine to the state
for initiating an unmeritorious prosecution, however, crime victims prefer to join a prosecu-
tion that the public prosecutor has already initiated. By this device, thepartie civile repre-
sents only his own interest in obtaining compensation.
The presence of the parlie civile and his lawyer is thus commonplace in French crim-
inal trials. By allowing him to become a parasite on the prosecutor's proof, a criminal prose-
cution initiated by the public prosecutor affords the crime victim a speedy and simple means
of obtaining compensation. The parlie civile nevertheless imposes a considerable strain on
the French criminal justice system because a large number of personal injury cases (e.g.,
automobile accident and medical malpractice cases) are tried exclusively in the criminal
courts on the basis of the offense allegedly committed by the defendant driver or doctor.
This phenomenon forces the criminal court to resolve difficult issues of causation, damages,
and comparative fault which it could otherwise leave to civil litigation. Although the victim
may choose to bring an independent lawsuit in the civil courts, that civil case must await the
outcome of any criminal prosecution and is controlled by the result. To the French legal
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creating an office of narrowly defined authority. The French legal sys-
tem thus defines what the prosecutor and the police may do rather than
recognizing various individuals rights that they may not infringe at all
(e.g., the privilege of self-incrimination) or that they may not invade
unless they have good cause to do so (e.g., the right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures).
This emphasis on statutory authority limits prosecutorial power in
two ways, neither of which has proved to be particularly effective.
First, the Code of Criminal Procedure authorizes the prosecutor to do
certain things, and if he does something outside of that authorization
his actions are extralegal at best and most likely illegal.53 The French
prosecutor's and police's practice of citing specific statutory authority
for every official act attests to the prevalence of this approach. As will
be seen, however, they have not always restricted their activities to the
areas of their legal authority. Moreover, the Parliament from time to
time has delegated broad investigatory authority to prosecutors and the
police.
In addition to enumerating what the prosecutor may do, French
law also requires that he not perform functions delegated to another
type of official. Treatise writers on French criminal procedure have
derived from the structure of the Code of Criminal Procedure the basic
principle of the separation of functions between lapoursuite (the prose-
cution), l'instruction (the pre-trial judicial investigation of an alleged
offense by an examining magistrate), and le jugement (the trial).54
Under this tripartite separation of functions, the charging function is
part of the prosecutor's office and the investigative function belongs to
a professional judge - the examining magistrate.55
The Code confers broad investigatory powers on the examining
magistrate to conduct searches and seizures, to question witnesses, and
to detain and interrogate suspects. The draftsmen of the 1808 Code
conferred these coercive investigatory powers on a judge rather than on
a prosecutor because they considered the exercise of these powers to be
mind, the vindication of the public's interest in the criminal trial is paramount, and the
result reached in that supposedly superior forum binds the civil courts.
53. G. DENIS, L'ENQUFTE PRELIMINAIRE 53-55 (1974); 2 MERLE & VITU, supra note 39,
at 310-12.
54. G. STEFANI & G. LEVASSEUR, PROC-DURE PENALE 41-44, 65 (10th ed. 1977) [here-
inafter cited as STEFANI & LEVASSEUR, PROCEDURE PtNALE]; I MERLE & VITU, supra note
I1, at 192-93; G. BERGOIGNAN-ESPER, LA StPARATION DES FONCTIONS DE JUSTICE
RtPRESSIVE 9-10, 19-22 (1973).
55. Examining magistrates normally serve in that capacity for about three years before
moving on in their judicial career to a higher position in the trial or appellate courts.
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a judicial prerogative.56 The examining magistrate's statutory author-
ity has not changed much over the years, but the separation of func-
tions principle has not proved strong enough to prevent the prosecutor
and the police from acquiring coercive investigatory powers similar to
those of the examining magistrate.
C. The Decline of the Examining Magistrate
The Code of Criminal Procedure of 1808 assigned to the examin-
ing magistrate a dominant role in investigating offenses and in bringing
defendants to trial.57 Under the Code's classic separation of functions
approach, the prosecutor's decision to charge an individual with an of-
fense was followed not by a trial but by a judicial investigation (instruc-
tion priparatoire)58 conducted by an examining magistrate. The
examining magistrate gathered the evidence into a dossier and deter-
mined whether there was sufficient cause to remand a defendant to
trial.
The office of the examining magistrate still exists in France, but
the magistrate no longer plays a dominant role. The police, under the
prosecutor's supervision, investigate most offenses and prepare trial
dossiers; and the prosecutor has devised ways to circumvent the magis-
trate's check on his charging authority. It is nevertheless important to
understand the process of instruction because the examining magistrate
performs a number of functions that affect the prosecutor's authority
and an individual's rights.
The prosecutor initiates a judicial investigation by filing a charg-
ing document (r'quisitoire) before the examining magistrate requesting
him to investigate the facts alleged therein.59 Once charged, a suspect
has the right to know the proofs against him, and the magistrate must
afford him an opportunity to be heard with counsel in his own de-
56. G. BERGOIGNAN-ESPER, LA StPARATION DES FONCTIONS DE JUSTICE REPRESSIVE
19-20 (1973); G. DENIS, L'ENQUETE PRtLIMINAIRE 51-55 (1974); i MERLE & ViTU, supra
note 11, at 310. In the minds of the draftsmen, investigation was a judicial prerogative
because judges historically had exercised that function and because the assignment of the
investigating power to the judiciary furthered individual security.
57. 1 MERLE & VITU, supra note 11, at 181-83, 191-92. See also authorities cited supra
note 56.
58. The standard practitioners' treatise on the judicial investigation is P. CHAMBON, LE
JUGE D'INSTRUCTION (2d ed. 1980). For more scholarly treatment, see 2 MERLE & VITU,
supra note 39, at 391-585. The Code provisions on judicial investigation fill 153 articles.
See C. PR. PEN. arts. 79-231 (23e ed. Petits Codes Dalloz 1981-82).
59. A crime victim may also initiate a judicial investigation, and thus avail himself of
the state's investigatory machinery, by intervening as a partie civile before an examining
magistrate.
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fense.6 ° Under the separation of functions principle, the examining
magistrate operates independently of the prosecutor and of the trial
courts in conducting the investigation, although he cannot open an in-
vestigation on his own initiative. The prosecutor may request but not
require the magistrate to proceed with the investigation in a particular
fashion; he may also obtain review of the magistrate's unfavorable rul-
ings by a panel of appellate judges (the chambre d'accusation). That
body supervises the judicial investigations conducted within its territo-
rial jurisdiction and has broad powers to revise the examining magis-
trate's rulings. The trial courts, on the other hand, are normally bound
by the magistrate's rulings and must try all defendants remanded for
trial.
In what is recognized as a derogation of the separation of func-
tions principle, 61 the examining magistrate does enjoy some indepen-
dent charging authority. The prosecutor's charging document, which
opens the investigation, confers on the examining magistrate a jurisdic-
tion in rem to investigate the facts alleged therein. Although the prose-
cutor normally names one or more suspects62 and charges a violation of
a particular Code provision, the magistrate has the authority to remand
to trial other individuals for the same facts and to modify the charges.
In all cases, however, the magistrate may investigate only those facts
alleged by the prosecutor in the charging document and may remand a
defendant for trial only on the basis of those facts. In addition, the
magistrate lacks the authority to remand a defendant to trial for a
crime (the most serious category of offenses). The chambre
d'accusation must review the magistrate's investigation and decide
whether to file an accusation against the defendant in a cour d'assises.63
The following chart depicts the processing of a case through this
complex system:
60. The suspect acquired these rights in 1897 when the Parliament adopted the famous
loi Constans. See infra text at note 140.
61. G. BERGOIGNAN-ESPER, LA StPARATION DES FONCTIONS DE JUSTICE RtPRESSIVE
33-36 (1973).
62. A rquisitoire against X or persons unknown is also permissible.
63. For dolits and contraventions, the process of instruction is somewhat simpler than it is
for crimes: a magistrate may remand the defendant to trial without the intervention of the
chambre d'accusation, and the defendant may not appeal the remand to the Cour de cassa-
tion as he could if he were charged with a crime.
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A judicial investigation is a mandatory step in bringing a defend-
ant to trial for a crime before a cour d'assises. This requirement in
theory significantly limits the prosecutor's charging authority. An in-
dependent judicial check on prosecutorial discretion is potentially a far
more effective safeguard than that supplied in this country by the grand
jury or by the committing magistrate. The grand jury does not function
as an effective screening device due to the prosecutor's dominant role
before that body,' and the effectiveness of the preliminary hearing
often is impaired by the defendant's inability or reluctance to put on a
defense at that stage of the process.6" In France, on the other hand, the
magistrate is under a statutory obligation to investigate thoroughly the
prosecutor's factual allegations and to hear the defense.66 The magis-
trate also has the stature and legal knowledge to resist a prosecutor who
presses unwarranted charges. Finally, the formal accusation charging
the defendant with a crime must recite the facts found by the magistrate
and correctly apply the law to them, and the defendant may obtain pre-
trial review of the accusation's legal sufficiency from the Supreme
Court (Cour de cassation).
The check on prosecutorial discretion provided by the judicial in-
vestigation has in fact proved to be too effective because it is too cum-
bersome to be used in all but the most serious cases. The prosecutor in
large part has circumvented this limitation by the long-standing prac-
tice of correctionalisation: he charges a defendant who has committed a
crime with only a d'lit or a contravention. For the prosecution of d~'its
or contraventions, a judicial investigation is optional, and the prosecu-
tor may directly invoke the trial court's jurisdiction by filing a charging
document (a citation) with the court.
The severity of the punishment provisions in the penal Code and
the relative formality of a trial in the cour d'assises have further en-
couraged the development of this extralegal practice. For example, the
Penal Code defines as crimes most forms of aggravated theft (e.g., theft
by violence, by breaking and entering, or by an employee). A busy
prosecutor views with distaste the prospect of trying all such offenses
under the cumbersome procedures of the cour d'assises. His response
to the legislature's "overcriminalization" is to charge the defendant
64. Hearings on HR. 94 Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenship and Interna-
tional Law of the House Comm on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 818-19 (1977); M.
FRANKEL & G. NAFTALiS, THE GRAND JURY 99-101 (1977). See also Hawkins v. Super.
Ct., 22 Cal. 3d 584, 589-90, 586 P.2d 916, 919, 150 Cal. Rptr. 435, 438 (1978).
65. See, e.g., State v. Altman, 107 Ariz. 93, 95, 482 P.2d 460, 462 (1971); Amelia, Re-
forming the Federal Grand Jury and the State Preliminary Hearing to Prevent Conviction
Without Adudication, 78 MICH. L. REV. 463, 482-83 (1980).
66. C. PR. PAN. arts. 81, 114-118 (23e ed. Petits Codes Dalloz 1981-82).
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with the dblit of simple theft by ignoring the aggravating factor (e.g.,
the breaking and entering or the defendant's status as the victim's em-
ployee) in those cases where he believes the authorized punishment for
the dbfit to be sufficient. Through this discretionary, unilateral deter-
mination, the prosecutor avoids the necessity of a judicial investigation
and may bring the defendant to trial before a tribunal correctionnel
without subjecting his decision to prosecute to any screening device.
In this fashion, the great majority of crimes committed in France
are in fact prosecuted and punished as d~lits. Although both the de-
fendant and the judges of the tribunal correctionnel may object to this
deception, they usually do not because an objection would run counter
to their own best interests. The defendant would expose himself to
greater punishment in the cour dlassises;67 and the judges, who also sit
in the cour d'assises, would increase their own workload by increasing
the number of cases tried under the more formal procedures in that
court.
Despite recourse to correctionalisation, in some cases the prosecu-
tor cannot as a practical matter avoid a judicial investigation because
the examining magistrate possesses coercive authority that the prosecu-
tor lacks. The expansion of the police's investigatory powers has re-
duced the importance of the magistrate's authority to order searches
and seizures. But, at least prior to the enactment in 1981 of the contro-
versial law "Security and Liberty,"68 the magistrate's intervention was
essential if the prosecutor wished to secure pre-trial restrictions on the
defendant's liberty.
By American standards, the magistrate's authority to detain a sus-
pect prior to trial is extremely broad. The examining magistrate rather
than the trial court determines the individual's pre-trial status. This
jurisdictional distinction results from the heavy emphasis in French law
and practice on investigatory justifications for pre-trial detention. The
67. In one recent widely publicized case a defendant did successfully challenge the juris-
diction of a tribunal correctionnel. Charged with the delit of involuntary homicide for using
excessive force to protect his dwelling from a burglar, the defendant argued that his offense,
if any, was the crime of premeditated or intentional murder. On appeal, the cour d'appel
acquitted him of involuntary homicide and initiated the steps necessary to bring him to trial
for the crime of murder before a cour d'assises. Judgment of Nov. 9, 1978, Cour d'appel,
Reims, 1979 D.S. Jur. 1 92 note J. Pradel. The defendant preferred a trial in a cour d'assises
because he wished to submit his defense of self-defense to a mixed panel whose lay majority
he believed would be more sympathetic to his plight than the professional judges who con-
victed him in the tribunal correctionnel. For further discussion of this case, see Levasseur,
Crimes et deAls contre les personnes, 1979 REVUE DE SCIENCE CRIMINELLE ET DE DROIT
PtNAL COMPAR- [R.S.C.] 329. The Revue de science criminelle et de droit penal comparb is
the leading French journal on criminal law and criminal procedure.
68. See infra note 73.
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likelihood of the suspect's flight, the sole legitimate basis for pre-trial
detention in this country,6 9 is only one of several grounds available to
the French magistrate. When investigating a ddit, the magistrate also
may order a suspect detained to protect him from a hostile community,
to prevent him from repeating the offense, and to assure his presence
for interrogation.7" The necessities of the investigation provide addi-
tional grounds for pre-trial detention: a magistrate may order a suspect
detained to keep him from destroying evidence, from intimidating wit-
nesses, or from concocting a false defense with accomplices.7'
Despite its coercive powers, the office of the examining magistrate
has suffered a severe decline in twentieth century France, particularly
in the post-war years, and its investigatory role largely has been as-
sumed by the police. Examining magistrates are in short supply and
the crimes and the delits that they do investigate constitute less than
seven percent of the offenses reported annually by the police.72 The
prosecutor usually refers to the examining magistrate only the more
serious dblits that require either extensive investigation (the offender is
unknown or at large) or pre-trial restrictions on the defendant's liberty.
In other cases, the prosecutor naturally prefers to use the police to com-
pile the trial dossier because they are subject to his control and are
likely to proceed more quickly than the overworked examining magis-
trates who are usually burdened with the most difficult or politically
sensitive cases. Even more important from the prosecutor's perspec-
tive, the police are not subject to the same legal formalities as is an
examining magistrate and the defendant enjoys few rights during a po-
lice investigation. As a result, the police, subject to the prosecutor's
supervision, today largely are responsible for investigating offenses and
preparing trial dossiers.73
69. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1951).
70. C. PR. PtN. art. 144 para. 2 (23e ed. Petits Codes Dalloz 1981-82).
71. Id. para. 1. In the investigation of a crime, the magistrate need not specify his
grounds for detaining a suspect prior to trial but may exercise that authority whenever he
believes it necessary to further the investigation or to protect the public. Id. arts. 137, 146.
72. Today, there are less than 600 examining magistrates in all of France responsible for
conducting between 60,000 to 70,000 judicial investigations per year. While all of the ap-
proximately 1,300 cases tried annually in the cours d'assises are investigated by an examin-
ing magistrate subsequent to the prosecutor's decision to prosecute, almost no contraventions
and only about 60,000 of the 1,000,000 or more dblits reported annually by the police un-
dergo that process. The 60,000-plus dilits include, however, many of the more serious of-
fenses in that category. For more information on the number of offenses, see STEFANI &
LEVASSEUR, DROIT PtNAL, supra note 1I, at 1-6.
73. Article 31 of the recently enacted law "Security and Liberty" surely will accentuate
this phenomenon. That provision amends § 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to per-
mit the prosecutor to obtain from a tribunal correctionnel or its president restrictions on the
defendant's liberty prior to trial if the defendant is charged with a d~lit punishable by no
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D. The Rise of the Police's Investigatory Authority
The French Parliament has long been hesitant to give the police
explicit authority to investigate Penal Code violations. The investiga-
tory powers that the police actually exercised in the past were mostly
unauthorized or extralegal; the police simply did what they believed to
be necessary for effective law enforcement. Most of the recent legisla-
tion on this subject has done no more than legalize what the police
already were doing. This overt recognition of police authority came
slowly because their new role ran counter to the separation of functions
principle which entrusted the investigatory function to a judge and not
to the police, who were considered agents of the prosecutor. That prin-
ciple proved to be an ineffective limitation, however, and the police
eventually obtained the necessary statutory authority.
Despite the separation of functions principle, the draftsmen of the
Code of Criminal Procedure of 1808 realized that a judicial investiga-
tion was not the appropriate procedure for investigating all offenses.
Articles 41 to 46 of the Code provided that in a number of narrowly
defined situations when the police caught an offender red-handed (en
flagrance), they could exercise on the spot and for a reasonable time
thereafter basically the same investigatory powers as an examining
magistrate. Even this authority, necessitated by the urgency of the situ-
ation, was limited by article 32 to offenses subject to an infamous pun-
ishment. Although the courts and commentators generally understood
this statutory limitation to cover only conduct that arguably could be
classified as a crime, 4 the police did not hesitate to conduct such an
inquiry (enquste) in the case of a dblit if they apprehended the offender
en flagrance.T7
The Code of Criminal Procedure of 1958 extended the authority of
the police to conduct this enqubte deflagrance to cover those dblits that
were punishable by imprisonment.7 6 The Code defined flagrant of-
fenses to include offenses in progress, offenses just committed, or of-
fenses committed very near in time to the apprehension of a suspect
pursued by the public clamor or found possessing indicia of the of-
fense.7 7 Upon discovering such an offense, the police may immediately
more than five years imprisonment. The new Socialist majority is not seeking to repeal this
provision because it recognizes that a judicial investigation causes a delay that only prolongs
the pre-trial detention.
74. 2 MERLE & VITU, supra note 39, at 326 n. 3.
75. Id. at 326-27; G. DENIS, L'ENQUf.TE PRtiLIMINAIRE 61 (1974).
76. C. PR. PtN. art. 67 (23e ed. Petits Codes Dalloz 1981-82).
77. Id. art. 53. The same article adds to the category of flagrant offenses those crimes or
de/its committed in a dwelling whose head requests the police to investigate.
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open an informal inquiry.78 During that inquiry, the officers qualified
to conduct it may secure the scene of the offense, question witnesses
and suspects, conduct forcible searches and seizures, and hold in cus-
tody for twenty-four hours (extendable in certain cases for another
twenty-four hours with the prosecutor's approval) any witness or sus-
pect whose detention is necessary for purposes of the inquiry (the
notorious garde a vue).7 9 The Code does not provide a cut-off time for
the exercise of these powers, and in practice the police exercise them for
three or four days if the inquiry opens in a timely fashion and contin-
ues without interruption."°
The coercive investigatory powers enjoyed by the police during an
enqu&e deflagrance are limited not only by the temporal constraints
outlined above but also by statutory restrictions on the police officers
authorized to execute them. Some background on the structure of the
French police is necessary for an understanding of these important lim-
itations. The French police today are divided between the national po-
lice under the Minister of the Interior and the gendarmerie under the
Minister of Defense. The national police operate in most urban areas,
while the gendarmerie are found in rural France. French law also di-
vides the police into functional categories, distinguishing between the
administrative police (police administrative) and the judicial police (po-
lice judiciaire). The function of the administrative police is to prevent
crime or, more generally, to protect public security, health, and tran-
quility."' The judicial police's function, on the other hand, is to investi-
gate offenses by gathering proof and apprehending offenders.8 2 The
distinction is functional and not institutional: the same police officer
may act as a member of the administrative police one moment and as a
member of the judicial police the next. Whether a particular police
action belongs to one category or another (or perhaps to both) depends
78. Article 54 of the Code of Criminal Procedure requires the police officer who opens
the inquiry. to notify the prosecutor, but that notification is not essential to the inquiry's
legality.
79. C. PR. PtN. arts. 53-74 (23e ed. Petits Codes Dalloz 1981-82).
80. 2 MERLE & VITU, supra note 39, at 334-35. Although defense counsel often argue
that an enquire deflagrance may not continue for more than twenty-four hours after the
commission of an offense, the French Supreme Court (Cour de cassation) has upheld the
legality of an uninterrupted inquiry that lasted forty-eight hours. Judgment of Oct. 5, 1976,
Cour de cassation, Chambre criminelle [Cass. crim.]. See the discussion in Chambon,
L'ouvertureforcee du coffre des 4ehicu/es automobiles, 1980 Juris-Classeur periodique, la
semaine juridique [J.C.P.] Doctrine I No. 2983.
81. 2 C. DEBBASCH, INSTITUTIONS ET DROIT ADMINISTRATIFS 60 (1978).
82. C. PR. PtN. art. 14 (23e ed. Petits Codes Dalloz 1981-82); 2 MERLE & VITU, supra
note 39, at 278-79.
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largely on its purpose (i.e., on the motivation of the officer).83
The French Parliament has not authorized all police officers to ex-
ercise the coercive powers associated with the enqute deflagrance, but
has delegated that authority only to a special category of police officers
known as officiers de la police judiciaire (OPJs).s4 Although most gen-
darmes with five or more years experience are OPJs, the majority of the
national police are not. The relatively small percentage of OPJs within
that force are concentrated at the higher ranks or in special brigades.
Although other police officers, functioning as members of the judicial
police, may assist an OPJ in conducting an enqubte deflagrance or may
on their own initiative gather information in a noncoercive fashion,
only an OPJ may open such an inquiry, secure the scene of an offense,
search for and seize evidence without the subject's consent, and detain
witnesses and suspects. The OPJ must prepare immediately a proc's
verbal for that case describing each operation accomplished by him.85
The extensive police powers described above apply only to the in-
vestigation of "flagrant" offenses. Despite the silence of the Code's text
and the presence of much adverse legislative history, there developed
during the nineteenth century the extralegal practice for investigating
nonflagrant offenses called the enquate officieuse (official inquiry).8 6
This practice grew out of the need to furnish the prosecutor with an
evidentiary basis for his charging decision for nonflagrant offenses.
The prosecutor who received a denunciation or complaint 7 for such an
offense could always request an examining magistrate to investigate be-
cause French law has never imposed a probable cause or similar re-
quirement to open a judicial investigation. Although this procedure
relieved the prosecutor of the burden of gathering sufficient proof to
bring a defendant to trial, it was too cumbersome to be practicable.
83. 2 C. DEBBASCH, INSTITUTIONS ET DROIT ADMINISTRATIFS 62-63 (1978). The cate-
gory of a particular police activity. has many important consequences. For example, police
officers are responsible to a separate system of administrative courts for their administrative
functions and to the regular courts for their judicial functions. The two systems of courts
apply two separate bodies of law, so the legality of a police action may depend on whether a
police officer is exercising an administrative or judicial police function.
84. C. PR. PaN. art. 16 (23e ed. Petits Codes Dalloz 1981-82); 2 MERLE & VITU, supra
note 39, at 277.
85. C. PR. PtN. art. 66 (23e ed. Petits Codes Dalloz 1981-82). The misnomer "'proc.s
verbal" dates from the Middle Ages when illiterate royal investigators reported orally to the
royal tribunals. Today all proces verbaux are written documents.
86. On the history and legality of the enquire officieuse, see G. DENIS, L'ENQU9TE
PRtLIMINAIRE 28-29, 51-70 (1974).
87. A denunciation is the report of an offense to the police or to the prosecutor; a com-
plaint is a denunciation by a crime victim. No special form is required in either case, and
the distinction is significant only because the the complainant has the right to initiate or to
join a criminal prosecution as apartie civile. 2 MERLE & VITU, supra note 39, at 298-99.
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The prosecutor therefore relied on the police to conduct the inquiry
into most lesser offenses, for which recourse to the examining magis-
trate was optional. Relying on the police was less effective, however,
because absent any legal basis for the inquiry, they had no coercive
powers and had to rely on the consent of the inquiry's subjects.
In the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1958, Parliament finally le-
galized the enquate officieuse under the new rubric of the enqu~te pri'-
liminaire (preliminary inquiry)."8 The predominant view at the time
seemed to be one of resignation: because you cannot preclude the po-
lice from investigating nonflagrant offenses, it is better to legalize the
practice and at the same time to restrict its exercise .8 The Parliament
therefore authorized most police officers (not just OPJs) to open a pre-
liminary inquiry on their own initiative or on instructions from the
prosecutor. The Parliament attempted to limit this concession by deny-
ing the police any coercive powers in conducting the inquiry other than
the OPJs' authority to detain a witness or suspect under a garde a vue.9 °
In addition, the new Code required the police officers conducting a pre-
liminary inquiry to obtain a subject's express written consent before
searching his dwelling.9" In actual practice, the police have had little
difficulty securing the cooperation of witnesses and suspects because
the availability of the garde d vue provides the police with considerable
leverage. The police also may encourage a subject's consent to a search
by informing him that his refusal probably will result in a judicial in-
vestigation and a nonconsensual or forcible search authorized by the
examining magistrate.92
The police also have acquired the principal investigative role in
the 60,000-plus cases each year that are investigated by an examining
magistrate. A preliminary inquiry or an enquire de flagrance con-
ducted by the police normally precedes the magistrate's investigation
because the prosecutor invokes the magistrate's jurisdiction only when
the initial police investigation proves ineffective or when the prosecutor
decides to charge a person with a crime. In conducting the judicial
investigation, the magistrate almost always invokes articles 151 to 155
of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which allow him to issue a commis-
sion delegating to an OPJ the authority to investigate in his name.93
88. C. PR. PtN. arts. 75-78 (23e ed. Petits Codes Dalloz 1981-82).
89. G. DENIS, L'ENQUFTE PRtLIMINAIRE 145-47 (1974).
90. C. PR. PtN. arts. 77-78 (23e ed. Petits Codes Dalloz 1981-82).
91. Id. art. 76.
92. G. DENIS, L'ENQU9TE PRtLIMINAIRE 253-54, 261-62 (1974); 2 MERLE & VITU, supra
note 39, at 313-14.
93. On the use of commissions, see 2 MERLE & VITU, supra note 39, at 427-33.
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This general delegation authorizes the police to exercise the magis-
trate's powers as they see fit to determine the truth of the factual allega-
tions that the magistrate himself has jurisdiction to investigate.
Although the magistrate may give the police specific instructions on
which buildings to search and which witnesses to question, the long-
standing use of general delegations has resulted in a progressive flow of
the magistrate's discretionary investigatory powers to the police.94 The
only thing that an OPJ operating under a commission cannot accom-
plish in the magistrate's name is the interrogation of a suspect against
whom there is strong evidence of guilt.95
The investigation of offenses in France therefore has become
predominantly a police function. The police's statutory authority, aug-
mented over the years by amendments to the Code, exceeds in most
situations the combination of common-law and statutory powers of the
police in this country.96 In addition, French law (unlike American law)
has not sought to limit police activity during an otherwise lawful inves-
tigation by requiring that the police respect an individual's rights to
94. This change had already occurred by the early 1950's. See Judgment of Jan. 22,
1953, Cass. crim., 1953 D. Jur. 533 note C. Lapp (the Isnard decision); Judgment of June 12,
1951, Cour d'appel, Aix-en-Provence, 1951 J.C.P. II No. 6544 note A. Colombini.
95. C. PR. PEN. art. 152 (23e ed. Petits Code Dalloz 1981-82).
96. The principal exception to this generalization is the absence of police arrest powers
in France comparable to the power of the police in this country to make a warrantless,
probable cause felony arrest. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 417 (1976). But see
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589-90 (1980) (arrest warrant required to arrest felon in
his home absent exigent circumstances). Under the French Code of Criminal Procedure, the
seizure of a person for the purpose of requiring him to answer a charge is a judicial function
assigned to the examining magistrate, not to the police. See C. PR. PEN. arts. 122-136 (23e
ed. Petits Codes Dalloz 1981-82) (authority of magistrate to issue warrants); id. arts. 144 to
148-5 (authority of magistrate to order pre-trial detention). Even the garde a vue procedure,
which allows the police to detain a person who is lawfully in their presence, does not permit
the police either to enter a building or other private place or to bring a person before a
tribunal. Blondet, L'enqubte priliminaire dans le nouveau Code de procbdure pbnale, 1959
J.C.P. Doctrine No. 1513.
This limitation on police powers has not proved to be particularly significant. In the
case of flagrant offenses, the Code authorizes any person to apprehend the offender and to
bring him before the nearest OPJ, and it requires all OPJs to bring before the prosecutor any
person against whom there are "graves and concordants" proofs of guilt. C. PR. PEN. arts. 73,
63 (23e ed. Petits Code Dalloz 1981-82). The prosecutor then may initiate a prosecution by
filing a charging document before an examining magistrate or by proceeding directly before
a tribunal correctionnel. In the case of nonflagrant offenses, the police use the garde b vue to
bring the suspect before the prosecutor. Even though the police are not authorized to enter a
private building or to handcuff a person during a garde 4 vue, few Frenchmen decline an
OPJ's invitation to appear at the police station. 2 MERLE & VITU, supra note 39, at 319-20.
Such a refusal always arouses the police's suspicions. Also, in the case of flagrant offenses,
the police, with the prosecutor's approval, may escort a witness forcibly to the stationhouse if
the witness declines an invitation. C. PR. PtN. art. 62 (23e ed. Petits Codes Dalloz 1981-82).
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silence and to counsel or by requiring that they have adequate cause to
justify any intrusion upon individual liberty.
The police authority to detain a person under a garde d vue illus-
trates these two points. An OPJ may detain a person whenever "neces-
sary" for the purpose of a police inquiry.97 No further specification of
reasons for the detention, analogous to the probable cause requirement
for an arrest in this country, is necessary. The person detained may
neither consult with an attorney nor obtain a judicial determination on
the detention's validity. Moreover, there is no French equivalent to the
Anglo-American writ of habeas corpus. The threat to detain or the
actual detention of an individual is thus a potent weapon for inducing
him to furnish a statement or to consent to a search. Use of the garde &
vue for this purpose is not considered abusive under French law be-
cause it is intended to serve as an investigatory tool, enabling the police
to immobilize a person during a critical stage of the inquiry and to
subject him to incommunicado police interrogation.9 8 Although in-
stances of the third degree (lepassage au tabac) are relatively rare in
present day France, the institution of the garde & vue still appears from
an American vantage point to legalize excessive intrusions on individ-
ual liberty.
E. The Prosecutor's Dominant Role
The prosecutor, who supervises the work of the judicial police (ex-
cept when the police are acting under a commission from an examining
magistrate) thus dominates both the investigatory and the charging
stages of the French criminal process. The choices he makes signifi-
cantly affect the defendant's rights, although they do not have as great
an impact on the ultimate disposition of cases as do the plea agree-
ments struck by American prosecutors. For example, a prosecutor's de-
cision to "correctionalize" a crime by prosecuting it as a d~lit exposes
the defendant to less serious punishment but more informal proce-
dures. The judges still determine the defendant's guilt and the appro-
priate lesser punishment. The overwhelming majority of defendants
consider this trade-off to be a net benefit.
Prosecutorial domination of the pre-trial detention decision, on the
other hand, is more troublesome because the defendant suffers a loss of
liberty and an impairment of his ability to prepare for trial without
obtaining any offsetting diminution in sentence liability. Despite sev-
eral recently enacted reform measures, excessive pre-trial detention re-
97. C. PR. PaN. arts. 63, 77-78 (23e ed. Petits Codes Dalloz 1981-82).
98. See the authorities cited supra note 96.
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mains a major problem in France.99
The examining magistrate and, since 1981, judges of the tribunaux
correclionnels, make the actual detention decision. I°° They usually ac-
commodate a prosecutorial request to incarcerate a suspect, however,
not only because the grounds for pre-trial detention are quite broad,
but also because many magistrates believe that persons charged with
serious offenses should be confined before trial if there is strong evi-
dence of guilt.'' The decision to detain is widely acknowledged to
have a significant impact on punishment, because judges are more
likely to return to prison a convicted defendant who is already incarcer-
ated (even under pre-trial detention) than to send to prison one who is
at liberty at the time of conviction.I 2 Judges view the latter defendant
as a safer bet to remain in the community where he may receive better
rehabilitative services than are available in prison.
In the prosecution of dblits, the Code of Criminal Procedure con-
fers additional discretionary powers on the prosecutor to determine
how suspects are brought to trial. This authority derives from an 1863
amendment to the Code which originally applied only to offenders ap-
prehended by the police in the course of an enquile deflagrance.'! 3 In
1981, Parliament extended these provisions to apply in somewhat mod-
ified form to the prosecution of most all dblits.l° Under the old law,
the prosecutor could interrogate the suspect (normally held by the judi-
99. On January 1, 1981, detainees comprised 44.5% of the prison population in France
(15,849 out of 35,655 prisoners). The number of convicts in prison has increased only
slightly over the last decade, while the number of detainees has increased almost 50% from a
low of 10,899 in 1970 to a high of 15,849 in 1980. Tournier, Analyse statistique de l'evolution
de la population pinale mbtropolitaine depuis 1967, 1980 R.S.C. 743, 752. The statistics pub-
lished by the French prison authorities include in the category of detainees incarcerated
defendants whose convictions have not yet become final.
100. See supra note 73.
101. Judgment of Feb. 19, 1980, Cass. crim., 1980 D.S. Jur. 1. 235 note P. Chambon. For
a contrary view that questions whether magistrates abuse their authority in this fashion, see
the observations on the same case in Robert, Procdurep'nale, 1980 R.S.C. 1003, 1006-07.
102. H. LAFONT & P. MEYER, JUSTICE EN MIETTES: ESSAI SUR LE DtSORDRE JUDICIAIRE
89 (1979). The examining magistrate does not always grant the prosecutor's request to de-
tain a defendant prior to trial. Representatives of the rehabilitative model (social workers,
probation officers, or even ajuge de I'application despeines) sometimes intervene informally
to secure the pre-trial release of an individual with whom they have had previous contact in
the system. These informal interventions, which are usually not recorded in the dossier,
reflect the importance that the various actors attach to the magistrate's decision. Id. at
102-03.
103. The 1863 amendment was codified in former articles 71, 71-1 to 71-3, and 393 to 397
of the Code of Criminal Procedure. For the text of these now repealed articles, see C. PR.
PEN. arts. 71 to 71-3, 393-97 (22e ed. Petits Codes Dalloz 1980-81) (repealed 1981-82).
104. Article 51 of the law "Security and Liberty" repealed former articles 71 to 71-3 and
393 to 397 of the Code and promulgated new articles 393 to 397. For the full citation to the
new law, see supra note 22.
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cial police under a garde & vue) after advising him of his right to coun-
sel. 0 5 The prosecutor also could retain the suspect in custody and issue
an arrest warrant ordering him to appear for trial before the next ses-
sion of the tribunal correctionnel. °6 The new law no longer authorizes
the prosecutor to interrogate a suspect or to issue an arrest warrant, but
these changes are of little significance because the prosecutor is still
authorized to receive any declarations the suspect chooses to make and
to bring the suspect before the court for trial the very same day. More-
over, although the new law authorizes the prosecutor only to receive
tie suspect's declarations and not to interrogate him, the suspect is no
longer entitled to the assistance of counsel before he makes a
declaration.'0 7
This summary procedure has long been one of the less fortunate
aspects of French criminal justice. Its extension in 1981 to most all
d'lits was one of the most controversial aspects of the law "Security
and Liberty.' ' 0  By invoking this procedure, the prosecutor may
promptly bring to trial a suspect held by the judicial police under a
garde d vue. The trial normally takes place the same day that the
defendant first appears in court, although the defendant has the right to
a continuance of at least five days to secure a lawyer and to prepare his
defense.'0 9 Prosecutors use this procedure most frequently in urban ar-
eas to prosecute street crimes not involving serious bodily injury (e.g.,
property destruction, thefts, weapons offenses, illegal demonstrations,
resisting or insulting a police officer, etc.).'o A special chamber of the
105. A 1975 amendment to article 71 of the Code gave the suspect the right to the pres-
ence of counsel during this interrogation and required the prosecutor to provide counsel if
requested by the suspect. This reform proved difficult to implement because counsel often
was unavailable at the time of the interrogation. 2 MERLE & VITU, supra note 39, at 363.
106. C. PR. PEN. art. 71-1 (22e ed. Petits Codes Dalloz 1980-81) (repealed 1981-82). This
was the sole provision granting executive arrest powers in French criminal procedure.
107. Provisions in both the old and new law authorize the prosecutor to release the sus-
pect after verbally notifying him that he is to appear before the tribunal correctionnel for trial
at a date set not less than three days nor more than a month from the date of the suspect's
release. The Code treats this verbal notification (colloquially known as the rendezvous
judiciaire) as the equivalent of a citation, and the defendant receives no further notice of the
charges against him until the day of trial. C. PR. PEtN. art. 71-2 (22e ed. Petits Code's Dalloz
1980-81) (repealed 1981-82). The new provision is C. PR. PEN. art. 394 (23e ed. Petits Codes
Dalloz 1981-82).
108. See supra note 22. The new Socialist government has decided to retain this sum-
mary procedure (relabelled procedure d'urgence), but proposes to limit it once again to
flagrants d'lits. See Le Monde, July 26-27, 1982, at 5.
109. C. PR. PEN. art. 396 (23e ed. Petits Codes Dalloz 1981-82).
110. For bringing defendants to trial, the prosecutors in these areas rely on the citation or
on the related procedure of the rendezvousjudiciaire described supra note 107. The prosecu-
tor invokes the jurisdiction of the examining magistrate if he believes pre-trial detention is
warranted.
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tribunal correctionnel in Paris does nothing but try these offenses (sixty
per day with twenty percent or more of the defendants sentenced to
prison)' " I
The purposes of this system are: first, to provide greater deter-
rence through swift and certain punishment, and second, to avoid wast-
ing judicial time and effort on cases where. guilt is plain because the
defendant was caught red-handed. Although most Frenchmen appear
to share these goals, observers are uniformly troubled by the spectacle
of the summary trial." 2 The crowded courtrooms, the harried partici-
pants, the thinness of the dossiers, the rapidity of the trials, and the
unpreparedness or absence of defense counsel do not inspire confidence
in the system's fairness. French judges are sensitive to this problem,
and the direct confrontation at trial between the panel of judges and
the defendant at least permits the judges quickly to reach the merits of
any claim by the defendant that he was the victim of a mistake.
I 
,
3
The prosecutor's ability to control how a defendant is brought to
trial thus has significant consequences for individual rights. The
French criminal justice system seeks to limit the prosecutor's power
through the screening device of an examining magistrate, but the prose-
cutor has devised effective strategies for circumventing that check. The
structure of the system also attempts to limit prosecutorial authority by
enumerating those powers that the prosecutor may exercise and by as-
signing the investigative function to the judiciary. This check also has
proved ineffective as the police and consequently the prosecutor gradu-
ally have come to dominate the investigation of offenses, with a reluc-
tant legislature eventually giving its imprimatur. The result of these
developments is a criminal justice system in which the defendant's pre-
trial rights are eroded to a degree many in this country would find
unpalatable.
III. THE RIGHTS OF THE INDIVIDUAL
In the abstract, the French and American approaches to protecting
the rights of the individual in the criminal process appear to have much
in common. Both systems seek to protect what are essentially the same
111. Le Figaro, Sept. 23, 1980, at 12. See also L. Greilsamer in Le Monde, May 4-5,
1980, at 6.
112. See, e.g., de Celis, L'experience des enquires rapides au Tribunal de Paris, 1980
R.S.C. 957.
113. French judges are sensitive to claims of innocence and to the presence of mitigating
circumstances and make an effort to separate these cases from the great mass of cases involv-
ing defendants who are plainly guilty. The opportunity to interrogate the defendant person-
ally makes this possible. See the examples in Le Figaro cited supra note 111.
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rights. In practice, however, the French approach has proved to be a
less effective safeguard of individual liberty, largely because the system
is unwilling to recognize an individual's rights at the early stages of the
criminal process. Further the French system's formalism reduces its
protection of an individual's rights; the legality of an investigatory
practice often depends on whether it satisfies formal criteria rather than
on its impact on the individual.
A. Comparative Analysis
In the United States, an individual's rights during the investigatory
process and at trial provide substantial checks on the power of the state.
First and foremost, the criminal defendant has the right to due process
of law. This right requires the state to proceed against the defendant
only in accordance with the law of the land, i.e., under pre-existing
constitutional and statutory provisions as interpreted by court deci-
sions.114 Due process also provides the defendant with a right to rea-
sonable notice of the charges against him and to an opportunity to be
heard in his own defense. The defendant's day in court includes at a
minimum the right to examine the prosecution's witnesses, to offer tes-
timony, and to be represented by counsel." I5 This right arises from the
state and federal due process clauses" 6 and from the sixth and four-
teenth amendments to the United States Constitution, which the
Supreme Court has interpreted to constitutionalize the right to present
a defense. 1 7 Constitutional due process further requires that the state
proceed against an individual in a manner that is fundamentally fair.
State action violating an individual's dignity in a shocking fashion' or
affecting the reliability or fairness of the guilt-determining process" 9
violates the individual's right to due process of law. Finally, an indi-
vidual's rights include the privilege against self-incrimination and the
prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures, both of which
are recognized by state and federal constitutions. These rights explic-
itly restrict the state's gathering of evidence against an individual. The
state may neither compel an individual to give incriminating testi-
mony, 120 nor search for or seize incriminating evidence unless it has a
114. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 382 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting).
115. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948).
116. Id.
117. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 813 (1975). Ironically, Faretta itself recognized
the criminal defendant's constitutional right of self-representation. Id. at 812-16.
118. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172-74 (1952) (forcible stomach pumping).
119. Mooney v. Hoolahan, 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935) (conviction based on perjured
testimony).
120. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. I, 7 (1964).
19831
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
reasonable basis for doing so.121
-What are the rights of the individual in France? The suspect or
the defendant, like his American counterpart, has a right to have the
state proceed against him in a lawful fashion (i.e., in accordance with
the provisions in the Code of Criminal Procedure). The French
Supreme Court (Cour de cassation) has also. recognized a general re-
quirement of fairness in the gathering of proof analogous to an Ameri-
can's right to be treated in a fundamentally fair fashion. In addition to
this bundle of statutory rights and this judicially created right to fair
treatment, a defendant is also entitled to what the French call the
"rights of the defense" (les droits de la d'fense).
Although the "rights of the defense" have in fact proved to be the
principal limitation on the state's repressive authority, the precise
source and scope of this concept are unclear. It does not derive from
any particular Code provision; rather, French jurists regard it as ema-
nating from the Code's entire structure. Specific Code provisions
merely exemplify the more general principle. Untroubled by the
vagueness of the "rights of the defense" concept, French courts have
not defined it further but instead have applied it on a case-by-case ba-
sis. At a minimum, however, the "rights of the defense" concept re-
quires that the defendant receive notice of the proofs against him (i.e.,
access to the dossier) and an opportunity to defend himself with the
assistance of counsel.
The rights described above do not have constitutional stature. Al-
though the French Constitution does recognize a number of rights ap-
plicable to the criminal process (i.e., the presumption of innocence), 122
an individual may not invoke these rights before the regular courts,
which must apply only the statutory law. Enforcing constitutional
rights is the exclusive responsibility of a special Constitutional Coun-
cil.' 23 The expanding but still limited role of that body will be dis-
cussed in Part IV.
121. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968).
122. The Fifth French Republic of 1958 has a written Constitution which incorporates by
reference the individual rights recognized in the preamble to the 1946 Constitution of the
Fourth Republic and in the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen of 1789.
GODECHOT, LES CONSTITUTIONS DE LA FRANCE DEPUIS 1789 at 411 (1970). The presump-
tion of innocence is found in Article 9 of the Declaration of 1789.
123. The Constitutional Council recently decided that the "rights of the defense" princi-
ple is of constitutional stature. Judgment of Jan. 19-20, 1981, Con. const., reprinted in Philip,
La decision sicurfte et libertu des 19 et 20janvier 1981, 1981 R.D.P. 651, 686. For a discussion
on the limited effect of this decision, see infra text accompanying notes 212-31. For a dis-
cussion of the basis of the decision, see infra note 219.
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B. The "Rights of the Defense" and the Stages
of the Criminal Process
The "rights of the defense" concept has not effectively limited state
authority because the protection it affords the individual varies from
one stage of the criminal process to the next. During a judicial investi-
gation, and to a greater extent during the trial itself, the "rights of the
defense" offer the defendant his greatest protection.' 24 On the other
hand, the "rights of the defense" do not apply at all during the earlier
stage of a police inquiry. Police officers may question both witnesses
and suspects, including those held under a garde d vue, and a suspect
against whom the police have strong evidence of guilt has no right to
know the proofs against him or to defend himself with the assistance of
counsel. 25 In this country, the Supreme Court has sought to protect
the suspect's rights during police interrogation by permitting counsel to
be present and by requiring the police to warn persons in custody of
their rights to silence and to the presence of counsel before interrogat-
ing them. 26 French law imposes no such requirement on the police,
although they must observe the statutory formalities for a garde ii vue if
they are interrogating a person so detained, and it is contrary to the
ethics of French lawyers to have any contact with the judicial police on
behalf of a client during the course of a police inquiry.'27 The "rights
of the defense" thus fail to protect the individual when he needs protec-
tion the most-during the police investigation.
As one aspect of the right to conduct his own defense, the French
defendant also has a privilege against self-incrimination, inasmuch as
the Code does not require him to respond to police or judicial interro-
gation by incriminating himself. ' 2  The defendant thus is free to
choose silence as his best defense. Comparison shows, however, that
this privilege is less substantial than its American counterpart.
French jurists uniformly condemn the physical abuse of persons
subject to police interrogation and conclude that confessions obtained
in such a fashion are inadmissible at trial.' 29 That protection is of lim-
124. In France, counsel's access to the dossier insures that the defendant receives notice of
the state's proof and not merely notice of the formal charges. Comparable pre-trial discov-
ery generally is not available as a matter of right to criminal defendants in this country.
125. 2 MERLE & VITU, supra note 39, at 198-99, 314-15, 332.
126. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-73 (1966).
127. 2 MERLE & VITU, supra note 39, at 307; F. PAYEN & G. DUVEAU, LES RtGLES DE LA
PROFESSION D'AVOCAT ET LES USAGES DU BARREAU DE PARIS 281 (J. Lemaire 3d ed. 1975).
128. Vouin, Privilege against Sef-Incrimination." France, 51 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY &
POL. SCI. 169 (1960).
129. Bouzat, La loyaut. dans la recherche des preuves, in MtLANGES HUGUENEY, supra
note 17, at 155; STEFANI & LEVASSEUR, PROCtDURE PtNALE, supra note 54, at 27-30; Vouin,
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ited value, however, because the physical abuse of suspects is in fact
quite rare. 30 The inherently coercive effect of most police interroga-
tions of suspects, on the other hand, is beyond dispute,' 31 yet the
French system does little to protect the defendant in that more common
situation. Suspects who are unaware of the police's case against them
and of their right not to incriminate themselves make damaging admis-
sions when confronted by stem officials who plainly expect answers to
their questions. A suspect's incriminating answers become part of the
dossier and are considered by the trial court as an item of proof against
the defendant if the statements appear to be true.
13 2
This protection against compulsory self-incrimination is substan-
tially less than that afforded suspects in this country even under the
pre-Miranda voluntariness test for the admissibility of confessions.
Under that test the confession's truth did not determine its admissibil-
ity; the relevant inquiry was whether the police's interrogation tech-
niques overbore the suspect's will. 13 3  Protracted incommunicado
police interrogation normally led to a judicial determination that any
resulting confession was involuntary and thus inadmissible.
French jurists themselves are troubled by the coercive aspects of
police interrogation, especially when conducted under a garde t vue. 134
Although some have defended present practices on grounds of practical
necessity in fighting crime, 35 others have condemned them for sub-
verting the "rights of the defense" during the judicial investigation and
at the trial itelf.136 From an American vantage point, the latter position
is more persuasive. Of what value are the defendant's rights at later
stages of the prosecution if he may be convicted on the basis of a con-
fession obtained by the police when he was ignorant of his rights?
137
Privilege against Self-Incrimination: France, 51 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POL. Sci. 169
(1960).
130. Hrones, Interrogation Abuses by the Police in France - A Comparative Solution, 12
CRIM. L.Q. 68 (1969-70).
131. Id. at 69-70; 2 MERLE & VITU, supra note 39, at 309-10, 315; STEFANI & LEVASSEUR,
PROC DURE PtNALE, supra note 54, at 270-72.
132. Hrones, Interrogation Abuses by the Police in France-A Comparative Solution, 12
CRIM. L.Q. 68, 77 (1969-70).
133. See Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 540 (1961); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S.
315, 322 (1959).
134. See authorities cited supra notes 129 and 131. See also Merle, La garde i4 vue, 1969
Gazette du Palais [G.P.J Doctrine 11 18; Judgment of Oct. 21, 1980, Cass. crim., 1981 D.S.
Jur. I 104 note D. Mayer. The Gazette du Palais is another French unofficial reporter.
135. See the police authorities cited in Hrones, Interrogation Abuses by the Police in
France-A Comparative Solution, 12 Crim. L. Q. 68, 69-70 (1969-70); G. DENIS, L'ENQUETE
PRtLIMINAIRE 243-46 (1974).
136. 2 Merle & Vitu, supra note 39, at 309-10.
137. Supreme Court Justices often have asked themselves this question and have reached
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Civil-law systems may well be superior to our own when, in a civilized
fashion, they encourage suspects and defendants to contribute what
they know to the proceedings; 38 but that encouragement should take
place in a setting where an individual knows the choices open to him
and has available the assistance of counsel. 139
Until the reforms initiated in 1897 by the famous law "Constans,"
a judicial investigation was also an inquisitorial proceeding where the
"rights of the defense" did not apply. That law recognized for the first
time the suspect's right to defend himself during the course of the in-
vestigation. Under the present Code provisions deriving from that re-
form, '4 the examining magistrate must formally "inculpate" the
suspect (i.e., notify him of his status as a suspect and of his right to
counsel) before interrogating him. The term "suspect" covers not only
all persons named by the prosecutor in his charging document,1 4' but
also any person against whom there exist "grave and concordant"
proofs of culpability. 142
French law thus resembles the recently abandoned "focus test" of
Escobedo v. Illinois 14 by requiring the magistrate to treat any person
against whom the magistrate has collected a certain quantum of proof
as a formal suspect entitled to the "rights of the defense." This ap-
proach affords potentially greater scope to the "rights of the defense"
than does the Supreme Court's present test for determining when a per-
son becomes constitutionally entitled to the assistance of counsel be-
cause it concentrates on the risk to the defendant of prosecution. In the
United States, a suspect has a right to be treated as a criminal defend-
ant and to receive the additional protection'" of that status only when
the obvious conclusion: none. See Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 53-55 (1949) (Frankfurter,
J., plurality opinion); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 324-26 (1959) (Douglas, J., concur-
ring); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490-91 (1964) (Goldberg, J. for the Court).
138. Schlesinger, Comparative Criminal Procedure.- A Plea for Utilizing Foreign Experi-
ence, 26 BUFFALO L. REV. 361, 377-81 (1977).
139. Id. at 377. Professor Schlesinger cites a 1964 German statute that recognizes the
rights of the defense during a police investigation.
140. C. PR. PtN. arts. 114-18 (2 3e ed. Petits Codes Dalloz 1981-82). On the rights of the
defense durirug the judicial investigation, see M. ESSAID, LA PRtSOMPIION D'iNNOCENCE
235-57 (1973); 2 MERLE & VITU, supra note 39, at 483-97.
141. C. PR. PtN. art. 104 ( 23e ed. Petits Codes Dalloz 1981-82).
142. Id. art. 105. The statutory language on this quantum of proof is: "des indices graves
et concordants de culpabilit'."
143. 378 U.S. 478, 490-91 (1964). The Supreme Court later abandoned the Escobedo or
focus approach. See Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 438-39 (1974). For discussion of the
Supreme Court's present approach, see infra text at notes 144-45.
144. The additional protection consists primarily of the right to the assistance of counsel
during noncustodial interrogation and during other critical pre-trial stages where counsel's
presence is necessary to assure the fairness of the trial itself. See Henry v. United States, 447
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the state formally has charged him with an offense or otherwise has
initiated adversary judicial proceedings against him. 45 American law
today thus looks to the proceeding's formality rather than to the risk of
prosecution in determining when rights attach.
Despite its potentially expansive scope, France's statutory "incul-
pation" requirement has failed to remedy the practice of coercive po-
lice interrogation. The requirement does not apply at all until a
magistrate opens a judicial investigation at the request of the prosecu-
tor who simply may delay or avoid making a request. Once an examin-
ing magistrate has opened an investigation, the police no longer may
conduct their own inquiry with respect to the same facts, but they nor-
mally continue their investigation under a general commission from the
magistrate. At this stage of the prosecution the police may question
witnesses but no longer may interrogate suspects against whom there
are "grave and concordant" proofs of guilt. The police in large part
have avoided this latter limitation by continuing to question a person
as a witness when the proof against him indicates that he should be
considered a suspect.
The Code permits this subterfuge because it forbids the police act-
ing under a magistrate's commission to question a suspect with "the
design to defeat the rights of the defense."' 46 Thus, the test for deter-
mining whether a person is a suspect is a subjective one. It does not
matter whether the police in fact have sufficient evidence of guilt as
long as they do not proceed in bad faith. Findings of police bad faith
are rare, 147 and French jurists generally concede that the subjective fo-
cus test has been ineffective in limiting the police interrogation of sus-
pects during a judicial investigation. 48
Once the magistrate designates a person as a suspect, 49 that per-
U.S. 264, 272-74 (1980) (defendant entitled to assistance of counsel during post-indictment
interrogation). But see Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 690 (1972) (no sixth amendment right
to counsel at a pre-indictment lineup). The right to counsel recognized in Miranda is a fifth
and fourteenth amendment right designed to protect a person's privilege against self-incrim-
ination during custodial interrogation. The person interrogated need not be a criminal de-
fendant. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
145. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398-99 (1977).
146. This subterfuge is not possible if the suspect is named in the prosecutor's charging
document. C. PR. PN. art. 104 (23e ed. Petits Codes Dalloz 1981-82).
147. See the authorities cited in 2 MERLE & VITU, supra note 39, at 443-44 n.5.
148. Vouin, Le malheureux article 105, 1974 D.S. Chronique I 1; Spiteri, Leproblkme des
inculpations tardives, 1966 J.C.P. Doctrine No. 2014; Pieck, The Accused's Privilege Against
Self-Incrimination in the Civil Law, II Am. J. COMP. L. 585, 591, 593-94 (1962). See also 2
MERLE & VITU, supra note 39, at 441-44.
149. A magistrate also may be tempted to delay "inculpating" a suspect so that he may
interrogate him as a witness. Magistrates, however, are less prone to this abuse than are the
police.
[VOL. 42
NONADVERSARIAL JUSTICE
son's rights during the subsequent judicial investigation are substantial.
At the suspect's initial appearance the magistrate must notify him of
the facts imputed against him, of his right to remain silent at that time,
and of his right either to choose his counsel or to have the court desig-
nate one for him.' 5 o If the suspect (now an incuop,) elects to be assisted
by counsel, he has the right to communicate freely with his counsel and
to have counsel present when the examining magistrate interrogates
him. In addition, counsel (but not the suspect) has the right to obtain
access to the dossier at least twenty-four hours before the suspect is
interrogated. '5'
Although the suspect knows the proofs against him, his right to
respond during the judicial investigation is limited. Counsel may sub-
mit written argument in support of a nonsuit, but neither counsel nor
the suspect may present any proofs other than the suspect's unsworn
responses to the examining magistrate's questions. Interrogating the
suspect on the facts therefore provides both an investigatory tool and
an important means of defense, and a suspect cannot be remanded for
trial unless the magistrate first formally inculpates him and receives
any unsworn statement he chooses to make.
The "rights of the defense" are more extensive at the trial stage of
the proceeding than during a judicial investigation. The basic source of
the "rights of defense" at trial is the noninquisitorial trial procedure
first established by the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1808. That
Code rejected the old Regime's secret, written, and "noncontradictory"
trial procedure and substituted a new form of trial that was public, oral,
and "contradictory" (i.e., that allowed the defendant to challenge the
proofs against him). 52 The provisions in both the Napoleonic Code
and the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1958 implementing these three
basic principles were often incomplete, skeletal, and uncertain in
scope.' 53 The courts, spurred by the treatise writers, nonetheless have
interpreted both codes to confer upon the defendant the basic rights to
be present throughout his trial, to hear the witnesses against him testify
live in the courtroom, and to contradict the proofs against him through
150. C. PR. PN. art. 114 (23e ed. Petits Codes Dalloz 1981-82).
151. Id. arts. 116, 118.
152. 2 MERLE & VITU, supra note 39, at 693-99; STEFANI & LEVASSEUR, PROCtDURE
PENALE, supra note 54, at 33-36, 564-68.
153. For example, article 427 of the present Code, which governs the trial of dilis in a
tribunal correctionnel, does no more than provide in general terms that "[t]he judge may
base his decision only upon the proofs which have been brought to the trial and contradicto-
rily debated before him." The Napoleonic Code of 1808 did not even contain an analogous
provision explicitly recognizing the defendant's right to contradict the proof against him
when on trial for a delit.
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his own denial or proofs. 154
Once again the uncertain scope of these basic principles does not
trouble the French legal mind. The French system largely leaves the
case-by-case implementation of the principles that a criminal trial must
be public, oral, and contradictory to the discretion of the trial courts.
The tribunal correctionnel and the tribunal depolice enjoy considerable
flexibility in implementing these principles because, upon appeal to a
cour d'appel, the losing party receives in effect a trial de novo where
any defects in the original trial may be readily cured. Although this
double degree of trial court jurisdiction paradoxically is not available
for the most serious offenses tried in a cour d'assises (i.e., the losing
party may not "appeal" the jury's verdict to a cour d'appel but may
only seek review on legal questions before the French Supreme Court
or Cour de cassation), that court's more formal procedures traditionally
have implemented the principles of publicity, orality, and contradicto-
riness to their greatest extent.
The Cour de cassation regards the implementation of these princi-
ples as largely a factual matter properly left to the trial courts. 15 5 For
this reason, the Cour de cassation, whose jurisdiction over the judg-
ments of both the cours d'appel and the cours d'assises is limited to
questions of law, rarely finds it necessary to quash a conviction on the
basis of these basic principles. An observer trained in the common law
might question, however, whether the tribunal correctionnel's heavy re-
liance on the dossier in most trials for d'lits adequately respects the
principle of orality. Most French jurists respond that these proceedings
receive all the time they are worth and that if the defendant's counsel
believed that reliance on the dossier rather than live testimony
prejudiced his client, he could pursue the matter successfully with the
154. See the authorities cited supra note 152. Although continental scholars refer to this
type of trial process as "accusatorial" in order to distinguish it from the "inquisitorial"
model of pre-Revolutionary France, the use of this term is somewhat confusing to common-
law lawyers who would reserve the word "accusatorial" for adversary-type procedures. The
imprecision of the label notwithstanding, the important point is that French jurists (both
those who drafted the Code and those who subsequently interpreted it) recognize that the
Code respects certain basic rights of the defense. For the use of the term "accusatorial," see
1 MERLE & VITU, supra note 11, at 163-65, 181-83.
155. G. BERGOIGNAN-ESPER, LA SIPARATION DES FONCTIONS DE JUSTICE RtPRESSIVE
98-100 (1973). The author cites numerous nineteenth century decisions of the Cour de cassa-
lion upholding trial court references to depositions of prosecution witnesses found in the
dossiers, even though the trial courts made no effort to call the witnesses to testify at the
trials. Most of these decisions involved the trial of a dlit before a tribunal correctionnel.
More recently, the Cour de cassation has gone further and has upheld convictions based in
part on evidence in the dossier that the trial court did not expressly refer to at trial. In this
way, the court can prevent the defendant from contesting the use of the evidence. See Judg-
ment of Dec. 5, 1978, Cass. crim., 1979 D.S. Jur. I 50 note S. Kehrig.
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court. '
56
The interrogation of the defendant, which opens the proceedings,
remains the central feature of the French criminal trial. 57 The presi-
dent questions the defendant directly, without waiting for him to take
the stand and without first warning him of his right to silence, all of
which naturally encourages the defendant to respond. Counsel of
course informs the defendant of his rights at trial, but it would be most
unusual for counsel to advise the defendant not to answer the presi-
dent's questions. The defendant is not deterred from testifying, as he
often is in this country, by evidentiary rules providing that evidence
particularly damaging to the defendant (e.g., prior convictions) may be
admitted only if the defendant chooses to testify. In France, the proofs
admissible against the defendant are the same regardless of whether the
defendant chooses to speak in his own defense. 1
8
Despite its inquisitorial aspects, the court's interrogation of the de-
fendant is also an important part of the "rights of the defense."' 59 The
Code provisions requiring the court to interrogate the defendant on the
156. A striking recent example in which the Cour de cassation quashed a conviction for a
violation of the principle of contradictoriness codified in article 427 of the Code is Judgment
of Dec. 5, 1978, Cass. crim., 1979 D.S. Jur. I 50 note S. Kehrig. For the text of article 427,
see supra note 153. In that case, a cour d'appel had increased the defendant's punishment on
the basis of a prior conviction mentioned in the dossier, but had not brought that conviction
to the defendant's attention at trial so that he could contest its use as an aggravating circum-
stance. The court's omission was particularly serious because, unlike a similar omission by
an initial trial court, it could not be rectified on appeal.
157. The court's interrogation of the defendant was the subject of controversy in France
during the 1950's when the Parliament was in the process of enacting a new Code of Crimi-
nal Procedure. The controversy centered on the questioning of the defendant by the presi-
dent of the cour d'assises, which traditionally involved, on the basis of the dossier, a
thorough examination into the defendant's life history as well as into the merits of the
charge. The principal objection to this practice was that it reduced the orality and freshness
of the trial by permitting the dossier (prepared by the examining magistrate) to dominate the
proceeding. In addition, it encouraged prejudgment on the part of the president, who often
in effect became an accuser seeking to extract a confession from the defendant. Vouin,
L 'interrogatoire de I'accusepar le President de la Cour d'assises, 1955 R.S.C. 43, 44-47. De-
spite these objections, the draftsmen of the new Code retained this interrogation as the cen-
terpiece of the trial, but expressly prohibited any premature expression of opinion by the
president. C. PR. PtN. art. 328 (23e ed. Petits Codes Dalloz 1981-82). See Vitu, La Cour
d'assises dans le Code deproc4durepenale, 1959 R.S.C. 539, 556-58. In practice, the presi-
dent's interrogation of the defendant has become less rigorous. The president now is more
inclined to accept the defendant's answers without pressing him and to leave the task of
identifying inconsistencies and contradictions to the prosecutor or counsel for the partie
civile. M. ESsAID, LA PRESOMPTrION D'INNOCENCE 267-81 (1973).
158. On the advantages of these and other devices that encourage, in a civilized fashion,
criminal defendants in civil-law systems to contribute to the truth-seeking process, see
Schlesinger, Comparative Criminal Procedure. A Pleafor Utilizing Foreign Experience, 26
BUFFALO L. REV. 361, 377-81 (1977).
159. M. ESSAID, LA PRSOMPTION D'INNOCENCE 268 (1973).
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
merits without imposing an oath 60 afford him the opportunity to re-
spond to the accusation without confronting the dilemma of either con-
tributing to his own conviction by acknowledging his guilt, or of facing
additional charges for perjury or contempt.' 6 ' The defendant therefore
enjoys the power or option (iafacult,') to lie and also the right to silence
if he believes that the latter course provides his best defense.
162
In most cases, neither choice offers the defendant much advantage.
Where the proof of guilt is strong, a defendant's confession is often his
best defense, because he may avoid thereby a heavier sentence.
163
Falsehoods may prove to be the worst defense, because the defendant
normally has been interrogated by the police or by an examining mag-
istrate before trial, and his pre-trial statements provide fertile material
with which to contradict his statements at trial. Although it is uncer-
tain whether a confession results in more lenient punishment, it is
widely accepted in France that the defendant caught by the court or
prosecutor in a tangle of contradictions and falsehoods receives the
most severe punishment.' 64 The infrequently exercised defense of si-
lence, on the other hand, exposes the defendant to whatever inferences
the court chooses to draw.' 65
C. The Defendant's Statutory Rights
The French system has attempted to protect individual rights
through numerous statutory provisions designed to ensure a proceed-
ing's regularity. This approach has proved unsuccessful, however,
largely because the Code does not provide, and the courts have failed
to devise, effective measures for enforcing these provisions.
The Code provisions rely heavily on formalism. This is especially
true of the procedures governing the judicial investigation and the trial
of crimes. For example, the Code provides in detail for the designation
of court-appointed experts, the selection of lay jurors, and the clerk's
notation of various judicial acts (such as imposing an oath on a wit-
ness). The Code also contains provisions that are intended to further
160. C. PR. PlN. art. 328 (23e ed. Petits Codes Dalloz 1981-82) (trials in a cour d'assises);
id. art. 442 (trials in a tribunal correctionnel); id. art. 536 (trials in a tribunal de police).
161. M. ESSAID, LA PRtSOMPTION D'INNOCENCE 272-73 (1973).
162. Id. at 273.
163. See generally R. THEVENIN, CRIMINELS, FOUS ET TRUANDS: LES GRANDS PROCtS
D'ASSISES 8 (1970).
164. Id. at 10. See also R. THEVENIN, MEUTRIERS SANS AVEUX: LES GRANDS PROCtS
D'ASSISES 1970 vii-viii (1971). Raymond Thevenin was the long-time judicial correspondent
for Le Figaro. Prior to his death in 1980, he was one of France's most respected lay com-
mentators on criminal justice.
165. M. ESSAID, LA PRtSOMPTION D'INNOCENCE 276 (1973).
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other goals, such as the protection of personal privacy or human dig-
nity. For example, articles 55 to 59 contain detailed provisions limiting
most dwelling searches by the police to the daytime, requiring the head
of the household or other witnesses to be present during the search, and
protecting private papers from unnecessarily intrusive searches. 66 Ar-
ticles 63 and 64 likewise contain provisions intended to prevent police
abuse of the garde t vue. 167 In addition to establishing the basic
twenty-four hour time limit for the police garde d vue, these articles
mandate that the police keep detailed records on such matters as the
time periods during which the detainee was interrogated, provide for
medical examinations of the detainees, and require the police to bring
the detainee personally before the prosecutor in order to obtain the lat-
ter's approval for a twenty-four hour extension of the garde d vue.
The Cour de cassation, unlike our Supreme Court, has eschewed
exclusionary rules as a means of remedying and deterring official mis-
conduct. The French court instead has developed an immense and
confusing body of case law relating to harmless error. Although the
predominant French view is that proof not obtained or presented in the
proper legal form is null and does not belong in a dossier, both the
Parliament and the Cour de cassation have developed rules for limiting
the instances when the latter must quash a conviction. Since the early
1960's, the Cour de cassation has quashed convictions only where it has
found a violation of the "rights of the defense." In other words, the
defendant must establish that a statutory violation prejudiced his more
general right to present a defense. 68 In 1975, the French Parliament
codified this case-law requirement of prejudice in an amendment to the
Code of Criminal Procedure. 169
The Cour de cassation is reluctant to conclude that the nonobserv-
ance of a particular statutory formality prejudiced the rights of the de-
166. C. PR. PEN. arts. 55-59 (23e ed. Petits Codes Dalloz 1981-82). Articles 95 to 100
impose additional formalities on dwelling searches authorized by an examining magistrate.
167. Id. arts. 63-64.
168. See notes by M.R.M.P. to Judgment of Feb. 3, 1961, Cass. crim., 1961 D.S. Jur. 287
note M.R.M.P.; Judgment of Mar. 3, 1960, Cass. crim., 1961 D.S. Jur. 167 note M.R.M.P.
See also 2 MERLE & VITU, supra note 39, at 549-51; Levasseur, Les nullitis de rinstruction
priparatoire, in MLANGES PATIN 453 (1964). The author of the case notes signed
M.R.M.P. was in fact Maurice Patin, the president of the Chambre criminelle of the Cour de
c=ssation.
The requirement of prejudice does not apply to the violation of a statutory provision
the observance of which is required in the public interest (e.g., jurisdictional limitations). In
these instances a judgment may be quashed without a showing of prejudice. See Judgment
of Apr. 17, 1980, Cass. crim., 1981 J.C.P. Jur. I1 No. 19632 note W. Jeandidier.
169. Loi no. 75-701 du aodt 1975 (codified at C. PR. P N. art. 802 (23e ed. Petits Codes
Dalloz 1981-82)).
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fense. This is particularly apparent with respect to the judicial
investigation, in which defects often are cured by the subsequent trial
process itself. 7 ' The court is even more reluctant to find prejudice in a
statutory violation during a police inquiry when the person's right to
defend himself against known charges has not yet attached.' Thus,
the Cour de cassation normally has refused to quash convictions on the
basis of irregularities in the garde ii vue even though those irregularities
may have prompted a confession subsequently used against the de-
tainee at trial. 72
D. The Defendant's Right to Fair Treatment
The requirement of fairness in the gathering of evidence, although
enforced through an exclusionary rule, has had a limited impact in de-
terring investigatory excess. Its ineffectiveness is due mainly to the
courts' failure to develop a flexible standard applicable to a variety of
situations. This shortcoming has left the right a protector more of for-
mality than of fairness.
The requirement of fairness has no explicit statutory basis but has
been formulated by the Cour de cassation as a general principle of
law 173 applicable to civil as well as criminal proceedings and to proof-
gathering by private persons as well as by police officers and examining
magistrates. The right to fair treatment thus applies during the police
inquiry stage when the "rights of the defense" have not yet attached.
Although the full scope of this right is uncertain, it does bar the acqui-
sition of proof through brutal or deceptive means similar to those con-
demned by our Supreme Court as fundamentally unfair. 174  In
addition, the French courts have gone further and have barred as un-
fair proof against an individual acquired in violation of the substantive
provisions of the Penal Code protecting the sanctity of the domicile,
private correspondence, and private wire communications. 75  Al-
170. See the notes by M.R.M.P. cited supra note 168.
171. Judgment of Oct. 10, 1968, Cass. crim., 1969 J.C.P. Jur. I No. 15741 note P.
Chambon; G. Denis, L'enquateprdiminaire 243-48, 354-56 (1974); 2 MERLE & VITU, supra
note 39, at 167-70; Bouzat, La loyaut dans la recherche des preuves, in MELANGES
HUGUENEY, supra note 17, at 155 (1964); J. Laut, Lesprincpes generaux relat!fs aux droits
de la defense, 1953 R.S.C. 47, 55-57.
172. See, e.g., Judgment of Oct. 21, 1980, Cass. crim., 1981 D.S. Jur. I 104 note D. Mayer.
173. On the role of judge-made general principles of law in a civil system otherwise based
on a comprehensive code, see I J. GHESTIN & G. GOUBEAUX, TRAITt DE DROIT CIVIL
333-40 (1977).
174. Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 323-24 (1959) (lies by false friend to extract con-
fession); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172-74 (1952) (forcible stomach pumping).
175. Judgment of Feb. 19, 1964, Tribunal correctionnel, Blois, 1964 G.P. Jur. 1 359 (proof
excluded because it was obtained by a private person in violation of the sanctity of the
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though an examining magistrate lawfully may authorize searches and
seizures that intrude into these areas, an OPJ may not proceed forcibly
on his own authority; if he does, he himself has committed an offense,
normally a d'lit. 7 6 Aproces verbal recording such an illegal operation
is void and must be stricken from the dossier (i.e., the court must not
consider it when determining the defendant's guilt).'77
Although the courts therefore reject proof that the state obtains by
committing a d'lit, they have not fashioned any rules comparable to
the American doctrine of "the fruit of the poisonous tree." It is widely
acknowledged in France that the police always have done a good deal
of illegal wiretapping 78 and have used the information they obtain as
leads for the subsequent acquisition of the same information in a legal
fashion.' 79 Theproc.s verbal presented to the court reflects only the
second operation and is. thus in proper legal form. The courts generally
have shown little interest in probing into the sources for the second,
dwelling); Judgment of Jan. 13, 1950, Tribunal correctionnel, Chalon-sur-Sa6ne, 1950 J.C.P.
Jur. No. 5669 note J. Magnol (private letters held admissible when not obtained through
delictual means). See also Judgment of June 26, 1979, Cass. crim., discussed in Levasseur,
Crimes et delits contre la personne, 1980 R.S.C. 715 (the case note states that intercepted
telephonic communications are not admissible when obtained through the d'lit of invasion
of privacy).
176. An OPJ lawfully may conduct a nonconsensual dwelling search in the course of an
enquire deflagrance. C. PR. P N. art. 56 (23e ed. Petits Codes Dalloz 1981-82).
177. Judgment of May 30, 1981, Cass. crim., 1981 D.S. Jur. I 533 note W. Jeandidier
(illegal nonconsensual police search of hotel room during an enqute preliminaire, proof
inadmissible because it was obtained by means of a delit).
178. Wiretapping was not a punishable offense until 1970. In that year, Parliament
amended the privacy provisions of the Penal Code to make overhearing or intercepting pri-
vate telephonic communications a delit. Lindon, Les dispositions de la loi du 17juilet 1970
relatives 6 laprotection de la vieprivee, 1970 J.C.P. Doctrine I No. 2357. Prior to 1964, the
majority of the judicial decisions on point refused to admit wiretap evidence, condemning
wiretapping as an unfair trick or ruse in the gathering of proof. Doll, De la legalite de
r'interception des communications telephoniques au cours d'une information yudiciaire, 1965
D.S. Chronique 125, 126-28. In 1964, however, a strongly reasoned decision by a trial court
rejected that analysis and admitted wiretap evidence as the product of a legitimate search.
Judgment of Oct. 30, 1964, Tribunal correctionnel, Seine, 1965 D.S. Jur. 423. The Cour de
cassation recently adopted this approach in a case where an examining magistrate had au-
thorized an OPJ to tap a suspect's telephone. See Judgment of Oct. 9, 1980, Cass. crim.,
1981 D.S. Jur. 1332 note J. Pradel (favorable). But see 1981 J.C.P. Jur. No. 19578 note G. di
Marino (critical). Under the 1970 amendments to the Penal Code, however, police wiretap-
ping is illegal unless authorized by an examining magistrate in the course of a judicial inves-
tigation. See Judgment of June 26, 1979, Cass. crim., discussed in Levasseur, Crimes et dblits
contre lapersonne, 1980 R.S.C. 715. Although the magistrate usually limits the discretion of
an OPJ acting for him under a general commission to investigate by giving specific instruc-
tions on which telephones to tap, there is no Code provision or case law specifically requir-
ing the magistrate to do so. STEFANI & LEVASSEUR, PROCtDURE PtNALE, supra note 54, at
27-30.
179. Judgment of Jan. 7, 1960, Cour d'appel, Poitiers, 1960 J.C.P. Jur. No. 11599 note P.
Chambon.
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
apparently legal police operation. Their concern is primarily to pre-
serve the legal formalities and not to regulate police behavior. The lat-
ter concern is collateral to a particular defendant's guilt or innocence,
and the French courts have always been hostile to collateral issues be-
cause they deflect the official inquiry from its central task. The French
and other continental systems have a greater commitment to the deter-
mination of truth than does a common-law system. 80 For this reason,
they impose fewer restrictions on investigatory powers and limit the
defendant's opportunity to enforce through exclusionary rules those re-
strictions that they do impose.
The weakness of the accompanying exclusionary rule is not the
basic reason why the general principle of fairness fails to serve as a
significant check on the state's investigatory powers. The more general
problem with the French approach is that the substantive standard it-
self is weak. Although the fairness principle does forbid certain investi-
gatory techniques, it does not ban much police activity beyond hard-
core brutality and illegality. Of course, the fundamental fairness re-
quirement in the United States affords even narrower protection. Here,
however, it is no longer intended to play a significant role; rather, it
serves as a fall-back limitation where no other constitutional or statu-
tory provision applies. The principal limitation on police investigatory
powers in this country is the fourth amendment's prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures. Rather than banning searches and
seizures, the fourth amendment limits them by insisting that the state
have a reasonable basis for proceeding with a particular search or
seizure. Very few searches or seizures or other investigatory techniques
are unfair in the abstract or in all cases, but most are intolerable intru-
sions on personal dignity and privacy unless the state has a reasonable
basis (normally probable cause) for believing that the intrusion is nec-
essary to protect the searcher or to seize evidence of crime.
This balancing of governmental needs and individual rights, ini-
tially developed by the common law and subsequently constitutional-
ized in the fourth amendment, focuses not so much on what the
government does as on the evidentiary basis justifying the govern-
ment's action. This approach is intended to protect the innocent indi-
vidual from the intrusions that legitimate law enforcement needs would
justify imposing on one reasonably believed to possess seizable evi-
dence. In France, on the other hand, the primary concern is with the
inquiry's regularity (i.e., the authority of the officials conducting it).
The French courts' failure to inquire into the state's need to exercise
180. Damaska, Evidentiary Barriers, supra note 6, at 580-87.
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authority in a particular case explains in large part why the defendant's
right to fair treatment, as well as his right to the observance of statutory
formalities, are not significant limitations on the state's investigatory
powers.
IV. JUDICIAL IMPLEMENTATION OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
The preceding parts of this article provide an overview of the
French criminal justice system. Part II describes how the prosecutor
and the police have come to dominate the investigation of offenses and
the manner in which defendants are brought to trial. Part III discusses
how French law recognizes and protects individual rights. That discus-
sion concludes that French devices for limiting state authority do not
compare favorably with their American counterparts. This Part de-
scribes several attempts by the French judiciary to determine the rights
of the individual in the criminal process. Given the system, it should
not be surprising that the decisions define those rights quite narrowly.
Furthermore, the court system itself contains a structural deficiency
that hinders the judicial recognition of individual rights. The body re-
sponsible for protecting an expanding category of constitutional rights
- the French Constitutional Council - is jurisdictionally isolated; its
decisions do not bind the regular courts.
A. The Dierent Stages of the Process: The Imbert Decision
The principle of fairness recognized by the French courts contains
a variable standard for determining the legitimacy of investigatory
techniques similar to the standard used for determining the "rights of
the defense."'' It is permissible for the police to do certain things (e.g.,
to use pressure or trickery to obtain a confession) that are not permissi-
ble when done by an examining magistrate, and the examining magis-
trate may do certain things (e.g., interrogate the suspect without
allowing counsel to interrupt) that a trial judge may not do. The limi-
tations on official power increase as the process progresses through the
police, the examining magistrate, and the trial stages. Although most
writers defend this triple standard in terms of the judiciary's need to
preserve its dignity, others more bluntly argue that the police are soci-
ety's first line of defense against crime and must be allowed to play a
certain amount of hardball in order to meet the offender in his own
181. M ESSAID, LA PRESOMPTION D'INNOCENCE 198-209 (1971); 2 MERLE & VITU, supra
note 39, at 167-70.
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league. 82
. Both of these points are well demonstrated by the aftermath of one
of the Cour de cassation's better known criminal procedure decisions,
Imberti.' In that case, an examining magistrate opened, at the prose-
cutor's request, a judicial investigation into allegations of bribe taking
by public officials and commissioned the police to conduct the investi-
gation on his behalf. Although the magistrate was conducting the in-
vestigation against persons unnamed, a public employee named Imbert
was plainly a target of the investigation. An OPJ, operating under the
magistrate's commission, had a witness (who claimed that Imbert had
solicited bribes from him) telephone Imbert and ask him specific ques-
tions which the OPJ had prepared in advance. The officer eaves-
dropped on the conversation by listening to the witness's &couteur (the
second receiver found on most French telephones) and immediately
prepared aprods verbal of Imbert's incriminating responses. This in-
formation provided the principal proof against Imbert at his trial for
bribery. The Cour de cassadon quashed Imbert's conviction on the
grounds that in executing the judge's commission the OPJ had em-
ployed an unfair ruse or trap which violated the defendant's rights.
The officer'sproci's verbal was therefore a nullity and could not provide
a basis for the trial court's judgment.
The Imbert decision attracted considerable attention at the time
because the court, rather than condemning the officer's investigatory
technique because it violated a specific Code provision, concluded that
the technique did not respect the defendant's right to fair treatment in
the gathering of proof against him. The commentators 84 uniformly
interpreted the decision to apply only to judicial investigations; the de-
cision did not impose similar restrictions on investigations conducted
solely by the police (i.e., an enquere preliminaire or an enquire de
flagrance). An OPJ operating under a commission, on the other hand,
exercises the same powers as the examining magistrate and, as the court
182. See Blondet, Les ruses et les artifices de la police au cours de l'enqu&e prtliminaire,
1958 J.C.P. Doctrine No. 1419.
183. Judgment of June 12, 1952, Cass. crim., 1952 J.C.P. Jur. No. 7241 note J. Brouchot
(the Imbert decision). On the role of the academic commentators in publicizing judicial
decisions, see supra note 21. The Cour de cassation and the lower courts do not cite prior
decisions but only applicable statutory provisions and, occasionally, general principles of
law. It is the commentators who synthesize the development of thejurisprudence (case law)
and trace whether subsequent decisions are consistent with earlier decisions. The Imbert
decision has been the subject of an immense body of scholarly comment. On the role of
precedent in French law, see infra note 225.
184. In addition to the comment on Imbert cited supra note 183, see Judgment of Jan. 7,
1960, Cour d'appel, Poitiers, 1960 J.C.P. Jur. No. 11599 note P. Chambon; Blondet, supra
note 182.
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in Imbert expressly noted, is subject to the same obligation to avoid any
deception or ruse that taints the judicial function.
The restrictive interpretation of the Imbert decision has pre-
vailed. 185 The police may and do employ ruses and other deceptive
techniques analogous to those condemned by the court in Imbert. De-
spite the commentators' urging, the Cour de cassation has refused to
invoke the general principle of fairness to place similar limits on purely
police investigations." 6 That principle still does impose some limita-
tions on the police, but the courts rarely apply it.'
8 7
B. The Police Stage.- The Isnard Decision
In the year following its decision in Imbert, the Cour de cassation
rendered another major decision which attracted considerable attention
because it placed a limitation on police searches.'88 In that case, an
examining magistrate in Nice had closed an unfruitful investigation
into off-track betting without remanding any of the suspects for trial.
An OPJ subsequently seized one of the suspects (Isnard) on the street
and conducted a body search which produced incriminating gambling
paraphernalia. Confronted with this proof while subsequently held by
an OPJ under a garde d vue, Isnard confessed to his participation in the
gambling operation. The trial dossier contained theprocds verbaux of
both the seizure and the confession. The Cour de cassation held that
the search was illegal and quashed Isnard's convictions for gambling
offenses. The court ruled that the illegality of the search rendered
unusable as a basis for judgment the proc's verbal not only of the
seizure but also of the confession. The court reasoned that the police
185. 2 MERLE & VITU, supra note 39, at 320-22.
186. See especially Blondet, supra note 182; 2 MERLE & VITU, supra note 39, at 320-22.
In one well-known decision, a cour d'appel did exclude a confession obtained by the police
during a garde d vue when the irregularities of the procedure were so great (namely the
absence of any recordkeeping) that the court could not determine whether the confession
was fairly obtained. Judgment of Dec. 12, 1962, Cour d'appel, Douai, 1963 G.P. Jur. I 407.
Although this decision is a favorite of the academic commentators, the courts normally have
refused to exclude evidence on similar grounds. G. DENIs, L'ENQUETE PRELIMINAIRE
246-48, 352-56 (1974).
187. Academic writers have argued vigorously that the courts should not consider confes-
sions that the police obtain through unfair methods of interrogation (e.g., the use of hypno-
tism or truth serum) because their reliability is questionable. See Bouzat, La loyaut' dans la
recherche despreu'es, in MtLANGES-HUGUENEY, supra note 17, at 155, 162-64; Laut, Les
princpes generaux relatifs aux drofts de la defense, 1953 R.S.C. 47, 53. Even though there is
little case law to support the position of these academics, many jurists accept their analysis.
2 MERLE & VITU, supra note 39, at 168-69. The absence of any case law may indicate that
the police also question the reliability of this type of evidence.
188. Judgment of Jan. 22, 1953, Cass. crim., 1953 D. Jur. 533 note C. Lapp; Judgment of
Jan. 22, 1953, Cass. crim., 1953 J.C.P. Jur. No. 7456 report Brouchot.
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action was a single unit and the confession was not freely given but was
promoted by the illegal seizure.' 89
The court's reasoning on the illegality of the search illustrates the
scope of the police power to search and seize. Although the Code of
Criminal Procedure contains no express reference to searches of the
person, the court ruled that the search of Isnard belonged to the general
category of searches (perquisitions) covered by article 56 of the Code.
Article 56 authorizes an OPJ to conduct a search only in the context of
an enqu&e deflagrance. Absent a "flagrant" offense, the officer had no
authority forcibly to search Isnard's person. Although Isnard in fact
was committing an offense in the officer's presence (possessing betting
slips), the officer had no basis for opening an enqu&te de flagrance
before the search because he did not observe any external sign of the
offense (aucun indice). The officer therefore lacked legal authority to
search Isnard without the latter's consent.
The commentators quickly identified the limited scope of the Is-
nard decision. 9 ° First, if the OPJ had observed an external sign of an
offense, he could have opened immediately an enquete deflagrance into
that offense and he could have searched the subject's person for the
proofs thereof. To open that inquiry, the officer must observe some-
thing incriminating (e.g., a furtive exchange indicating a gambling
transaction or a suspicious bulge indicating a concealed weapon); infor-
mation supplied by an informant is not alone sufficient.' 9 ' Second,
nothing in the decision limited the authority of an OPJ investigating a
nonflagrant offense (an enquteprliminaire) to seek the subject's con-
sent for a search. In the alternative, the officer could seek the prosecu-
tor's assistance in requesting an examining magistrate to open a judicial
investigation and to issue a commission authorizing a forcible police
search. Third, the decision did not affect the police's power to search a
person taken into custody under a garde ai vue or arrested under an
examining magistrate's warrant. These routine searches, the legality of
which was not contested, serve a protective as well as an investigatory
purpose and permit the police to maintain security at places of deten-
189. The Isnard decision comes as close as any French decision to recognizing an exclu-
sionary rule for illegally obtained evidence. The concept of taint adopted by the Isnard
court does not reappear in later decisions where the court examined eachprocds verbal sepa-
rately to determine its regularity.
190. In addition to the sources cited supra note 188, see Pedamon, Lafouile corporelle,
1961 R.S.C. 467; Langlois, L'enqubte deflagrant delit; son point de dpart et sa duree, 1961
J.C.P. Doctrine 1611.
191. The Isnard court explicitly rejected as a basis for opening an enqubte Isnard's repu-
tation as a gambler. See also Judgment of Jan. 13, 1975, Tribunal correctionnel, Aix-en-
Provence, 1975 G.P. Jur. 11711.
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tion. Fourth, the decision only restricted investigatory searches by the
judicial police aimed at apprehending offenders and did not affect pre-
ventive searches by the administrative police designed to protect society
from potential offenders. Because the same officer may exercise both
functions, he often will be able to accomplish in his administrative ca-
pacity what he is forbidden to do while wearing his judicial hat.
This duality of police functions has permitted the police to avoid
in large part the limitations imposed by the Isnard decision. The courts
have upheld, as a lawful crime-prevention function of the administra-
tive police, the widespread practice of searching a person in the course
of an identity check.' 92 If that search discloses an incriminating item of
proof, an OPJ may immediately open an enqure deflagrance and seize
the item.'93 The Cour de cassation, in its widely publicized Friedel de-
cision, 94 has limited its approval of identity checks and administrative
searches of the person to "exceptional circumstances" and has not ex-
plicitly authorized the police to detain a person at the station house for
identity check purposes. The lower courts nevertheless have not always
recognized these limitations, 195 and the police have interpreted "excep-
tional circumstances" quite broadly. Identity checks thus have become
a routine police operation in high crime areas or during tense political
demonstrations. The legality (as well as the desirability) of identity
checks and accompanying searches nevertheless remained a live issue
until 1981 when the Parliament, as part of the law "Security and Lib-
erty," authorized the administrative detention of a person for no more
than six hours for the purpose of carrying out an identity check.' 96 The
new law did not address directly the police's authority to search detain-
ees, but the administrative police have always had the authority to un-
dertake protective searches of persons in police custody.
192. Judgment of Jan. 5, 1973, Cass. crim., 1973 D.S. Jur. II 541 note G. Roujou de
Boubee (the Friedel decision); Judgment of June 28, 1978, Cour d'appel, Aix-en-Provence
1979 G.P. Jur. I 79 note P. - L.G.; Judgment of Jan. 13, 1975, Tribunal correctionnel, Aix-
en-Provence, 1975 G.P. Jur. 11711.
193. See supra note 192.
194. See Judgment of Jan. 5, 1973, Cass. crim., 1973 D.S Jur. II 541 note G. Roujou de
Boubee.
195. See Judgment of June 28, 1978, Cour d'appel, Aix-en-Provence, 1979 G.P. Jur. 1 79
note P. - L.G.; Judgment of Jan. 13, 1975, Tribunal Correctionnel, Aix-en-Provence, 1975
G.P Jur. 11711.
196. See articles 76-77 of the law "Security and Liberty" cited supra note 22. The propri-
ety of identity checks remains a live issue in France. After a vigorous internal debate, the
new Socialist government has decided to retain these provisions while adding some proce-
dural safeguards. Le Monde, July 26-27, 1982, at 5.
1983]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
C. The Issue of Probable Cause
The Isnard decision nevertheless is significant because it does im-
pose a limitation analagous to probable cause on the initiation of a
coercive official inquiry. The procbs verbal for a search of the person
and a subsequent seizure of proofs must indicate the external signs that
led the officer to open an enquie deflagrance if one had not been
opened previously. To an American observer, it is surprising that there
is no body of case law on the sufficiency of various external signs to
justify police action comparable to the immense body of law in this
country on what constitutes probable cause. It is also surprising that
the statutory provision governing the conduct of searches during an en-
quote deflagrance - article 56 - has not been interpreted to impose a
probable cause type requirement. That provision' 97 authorizes an OPJ
during the course of the inquiry to seize papers, documents, or other
objects from persons "who appear to have participated in the crime or
dblit or to hold proofs or objects relevant to the facts under investiga-
tion." The Cour de cassation has not construed the verb "appear" to
require some external sign that a search is likely to prove fruitful before
the OPJ commences the search.
The court likewise has not developed another potential probable
cause type requirement applicable to searches conducted during a judi-
cial investigation. Article 94 of the Code of Criminal Procedure autho-
rizes the examining magistrate to effectuate searches in places where
seizable objects "may be found."' 98 While this provision seemingly
limits searches to places where the magistrate expects to find seizable
objects, there is no case law and little, if any, discussion in the scholarly
literature on the question of what information provides a sufficient ba-
sis for the magistrate's belief. In the absence of bad faith or fraud, the
examining magistrate exercises unreviewable discretion in determining
the advisability of a search.' 99
In practice, it is an OPJ operating under a general commission
who normally makes the decision to search a particular place or person
during the course of a judicial investigation. In another portion of its
Isnard decision, the Cour de cassation approved this practice and aban-
doned its previous requirement that the examining magistrate specify
in the commission itself the dwellings to be searched instead of leaving
that determination to the OPJ. Thus, whether a particular search or
seizure (including a dwelling search) is a justifiable means for further-
197. C. PR. PaN. arts. 53-54 (23e ed. Petits Codes Dalloz 1981-82).
198. The French wording is 'Peuvent se trouver."
199. 2 MERLE & VITU, supra note 39, at 405 n.I.
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ing the investigation is left to the OPJ's discretion (libre apprbcia-
lion).200 There are no real limits on the investigation other than the
conscience of the investigator who must restrict his actions to the facts
alleged in the prosecutor's charging document.
There are two reasons for this lack of interest by the French courts
and commentators in the probable cause issue. The "official inquiry"
model for the investigation and trial of offenses provides the more
straightforward explanation. The existence of probable cause for an
investigatory action is collateral to the determination of the defendant's
guilt or innocence and therefore is not normally litigable in the crimi-
nal process. The official inquiry model's commitment to determine the
truth, however, is a commitment to do so within legal forms. The dos-
sier must establish that the police properly opened an enquire de
flagrance before conducting a forcible search authorized only in the
course of such an inquiry. To do so, the police must identify the of-
fense they are investigating. A "flagrant" offense is normally observa-
ble, and the mention in the proces verbal of an external sign confirms
the inquiry's legality. As with most statutory limitations on official au-
thority, this requirement of an observable external sign therefore re-
flects a greater concern for satisfying formalities than for justifying the
intrusion into individual liberty.20 With respect to police searches
conducted under a magistrate's commission, the prosecutor's charging
document provides the formal legal basis for the investigation.
The second explanation for the lack of interest in probable cause
questions involves the separation of functions principle. To the French
jurist, it is simply not appropriate for a trial court or for the Cour de
cassation to review a prosecutor's or a magistrate's decision on how to
proceed in the course of an otherwise lawful investigation. This view
contrasts sharply with the approach in this country where trial and ap-
pellate courts must review the adequacy of the justification for a police
officer's or a magistrate's decision to conduct a particular search or
seizure.2 °2
In accordance with the separation of functions principle, the pros-
ecutor's authority (including the authority to supervise the preliminary
police inquiries which serve as a basis for determining whether to initi-
200. See Judgment of Jan. 22, 1953, Cass. crim., 1953 D. Jur. 533 note C. Lapp; P.
Chambon, LE JUGE D'INSTRUCTION 390-91, 396-97 (2d ed. 1980).
201. See the discussion in Part III on the Code's formalistic approach to defining the
defendant's rights, supra notes 166-172 and accompanying text.
202. See Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 419 (1969) (review of magistrate's deci-
sion to issue search warrant); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964) (review of police officer's
probable cause determination).
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ate a prosecution) is separate from the examining magistrate's authority
to gather the proofs for trial, which in turn is separate from the trial
court's authority to judge the defendant. In this framework, the judges
would be usurping another official's function if they reviewed an OPJ's
or a magistrate's determination on the necessity or desirability of a par-
ticular search or seizure. The judges of course must insure that the
investigators observe the necessary legal formalities and may even hold
them civilly and criminally responsible in cases of bad faith, fraud, or
other serious fault. The court, however, may not otherwise question
the investigator's discretionary determinations. This separation of
functions analysis is confirmed by the scholarly criticism of the portion
of the Isnard opinion that allowed the OPJ to select the dwellings to be
searched under the general commission. The critics condemned on
policy grounds the court's allowing a police officer rather than a magis-
trate to make such an important decision during the course of a judicial
investigation, but they did not challenge the court's assumption that
regardless of who made the decision to search the court would not sub-
sequently review the decision on the merits.2°3
D. Police Searches: The Trignol Decision
The absence of a probable cause requirement for forcible police
searches conducted during an enquite deflagrance or a judicial investi-
gation, combined with the leverage enjoyed by the police to obtain a
subject's consent to a search and seizure in other contexts, contribute to
the high incidence of police searches in France. 204 A more recent deci-
sion of the Cour de cassasion,2°5 which for a judicial decision in France
203. See, e.g., Judgment of Jan. 22, 1953, Cass. crim., 1953 D. Jur. 533 note C. Lapp
(criticizing this aspect of Cour de. cassation's decision); Judgment of June 12, 1951, Cour
d'appel, Aix-en-Provence, 1951 J.C.P. Jur No. 6544 note A. Columbini (supporting the con-
trary result).
204. The October, 1980, police investigation into the desecration of various Jewish monu-
ments in Paris, which included the bombing of a synagogue resulting in four deaths, pro-
vides a particularly vivid example of this phenomenon. Operating in the context of an
enqute de flagrance or under commissions from an examining magistrate, the police
searched the dwellings of 60 or more extreme rightists in Paris. The basis for the searches
was the police's belief (shared by the general public) that the perpetrators of the bombing
were connected with several right-wing, anti-Semitic organizations which had recently ex-
perienced a minor resurgence in membership and public attention. The searches, however,
did not produce any proof of the offenses under investigation. Indiscriminate police
searches based on such scant evidence plainly are illegal in this country, even during investi-
gations of equally serious offenses. The legality of these searches, however, was never ques-
tioned in France. In fact, the press (especially the left-wing press) demanded more vigorous
police action against suspected right-wing terrorists.
205. Judgment of Nov. 8, 1979, Cass. crim., 1980 J.C.P. Jur. No. 19337 note J. Davia (the
Trignol decision).
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received unprecedented attention in the popular press, further aug-
mented police powers.
In that case, a tribunal correctionnel in Paris convicted and fined a
motorist named Trignol for refusing to submit to a search of his car
trunk by an OPJ who had stopped Trignol's vehicle on the public high-
way. The incident that gave rise to the prosecution occurred in Paris
on January 27, 1978. Four days previously, armed kidnappers had
seized a prominent French industralist several kilometers from the spot
where Trignol subsequently was stopped. At the time Trignol was
stopped, the kidnappers still held their victim captive in an unknown
location, and the OPJ who stopped Trignol's car was one of the hun-
dreds of officers conducting the enquire deflagrance into the continuing
offense of the industrialist's kidnapping.20 6 The officer forced open the
trunk of Trignol's car after Trignol refused to open it with a key, but
the search that followed proved unfruitful. The officer, on orders from
his superiors in the Ministry of Justice, was conducting an operation
colloquially known as a coup de poing (literally, "punch") whereby
thousands of motorists in Paris during the week after the kidnapping
were stopped and subjected to identity checks and car searches. The
Minister of the Interior, Michel Poniatowski, had deliberately adopted
this strategy as a technique to combat terrorist violence. Trignol, for
reasons that will be developed later, was one of the few (if not the only)
French motorists to refuse to submit to the search.207
To the consternation of the academic commentators, the cour
d'appel of Paris again convicted Trignol on appeal (at his trial de novo)
and the Cour de cassation rejected his appeal from the conviction. 20 8
The reasoning of both courts was quite simple: In the context of an
206. The enquire deflagrance did not end until February 3, 1978, when the prosecutor
requested an examining magistrate to open a judicial investigation into the still unsolved
crime.
207. The prosecution plainly wished to make a test case out of Trignol's refusal to open
his trunk, and the manner in which it did so was questionable. A subject's verbal objection
or passive resistance to an OPJ's proper search normally is not an offense, although the
officer may use whatever force is necessary to accomplish the search. Trignol was prose-
cuted under article 4 of the Highway Code, which requires a motorist to submit to all police
verifications concerning the condition of his vehicle. Commentators on the Trignol decision
have argued forcefully that article 4 was intended to punish refusals to submit to safety and
related inspections by the administrative police, not passive refusals to submit to investiga-
tory searches by the judicial police. An officer functioning as part of the administrative
police, unlike an OPJ conducting an enquIe deflagrance, needs the criminal sanction in
article 4 because he may not employ force to accomplish his objective. Chambon,
L'oupertureforce du coffre des vbhicules automobiles, 1980 J.C.P. Doctrine I No. 2983.
208. In addition to the sources cited supra notes 205 & 207, see Rivero, Note, Decision du
12janvier 1977, 1978 ACTUALITt JURIDIQUE, DROIT ADMINISTRATIF [A.J.D.A.] 215.Actual-
itbjuridique, droit administratif is a leading French journal on administrative law.
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enqure deflagrance, an OPJ may lawfully execute a search without the
subject's consent, and by refusing to submit to the search, Trignol vio-
lated the special statutory provision under which he was prosecuted.2 °9
The commentators were dismayed by the courts' failure to place any
nontemporal limits on police searches during the course of an enquate
de flagrance. It was beyond dispute that the police had properly
opened an inquiry into the kidnapping and, given the ongoing nature
of the offense, were properly continuing their investigation. The Cour
de cassation's analysis in Trignol plainly suggests that an OPJ who is
conducting a proper enqu&e deflagrance is authorized to search any
individual, vehicle, or dwelling within his territorial jurisdiction pro-
vided he recites in hisprocds verbal that his purpose in searching was to
uncover proofs of the offense. Moreover, nothing in the decision limits
its applicability to the investigation of offenses like an ongoing kidnap-
ping where broad search powers appear justifiable. Trignol thus
alerted French jurists to what they should have known all along: police
powers during an enqute deflagrance are extremely broad.
Trignol's critics 21 ° have argued that the courts must protect indi-
vidual liberty by further limiting police searches during an enqu.te de
flagrance. The statutory materials at hand, however, are not well
suited for that task. Although the reference in article 56 to persons who
"4appear" to have participated in any offense or to possess seizable evi-
dence provides a potential limitation, reliance on that section would
require the courts to determine whether appearances justified the polic-
ing action. Perhaps recognizing the difficulties with such an approach,
the critics instead have chosen to argue that, under the definition of a
"flagrant" offense in article 53 of the Code, an external sign of the of-
fense is required not only to open an enqute deflagrance but also to
execute a search during an inquiry already opened. 21 ' This argument
may be more appealing to French jurists because it focuses on the
search's regularity. But it appears to be inconsistent with the Code's
formalistic approach in that other aspects of the enqute deflagrance
(e.g., the questioning of a witness) may continue in the absence of an
external sign once the police properly have opened the inquiry.
209. See supra note 207. The statutory provision was "special" because it was limited to
vehicle searches. Thus, a homeowner's refusal to assist an OPJ in a dwelling search by
unlocking the door is not an offense. The judicial police may, of course, break down the
door if necessary to gain entrance.
210. See e.g., Rivero, Note, Decision du 12 janyier 1977, 1978 A.J.D.A. 215, 218;
Chambon, L 'ouvertureforc&e du coffre des vbhicules automobiles, 1980 J.C.P. Doctrine No. I
2983.
211. See supra note 210.
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E. The Intervention of the Constitutional Council
The failure of the Code and the regular courts effectively to limit
investigatory searches has encouraged a resort to constitutional argu-
ments for protecting individual rights, but it remains to be seen
whether the recent judicial recognition in France of the individual's
constitutional rights will provide a significant check. Trignol had based
his refusal to open his automobile trunk on a recent decision by the
French Constitutional Council (the Conseil constitutionnel) declaring
unconstitutional a law adopted by the Parliament that authorized an
officer or agent of the judicial police to search any vehicle on the public
highway.21 The Court held that the "breadth" of the power to search
that the law conferred on the police violated the constitutional right to
individual liberty. The law in effect authorized almost every police of-
ficer in France2' 3 to search any vehicle on the public highway for any
reason whatever or for no reason at all. The only limitation in the law
was the requirement that the search take place in the presence of the
owner or driver of the vehicle. Trignol, a professor who was familiar
with the Constitutional Council's decision, believed that the operation
coup de poing involved the same arbitrary, random searches con-
demned by that court.2 4 He refused to open his trunk on that basis
and argued in his defense that he could not be convicted for refusing to
submit to an unconstitutional search.
To understand the regular (i.e., the nonconstitutional) courts' re-
jection of Trignol's argument and the limited effect that the newly rec-
ognized constitutional rights of the individual have had on the official
inquiry model, it is necessary to describe briefly the judicial review of
statutes in France for constitutionality.215 The French revolutionary
tradition has always recognized the sovereignty of the law (i.e., statu-
tory law). Constitutional texts such as the Declaration of the Rights of
Man and of the Citizen of 1789 were intended to inspire the people and
212. Judgment of Jan. 12, 1977, Con. const., 1978 D.S. Jur. 1 173 note L. Hamon & J.
L6aut6; Rivero, Deision du 12janvier 1977, 1978 A.J.D.A. 215.
213. The power to search was not limited to OPJs but also was conferred on a broader
class of agents de lapolicejudiciaire who, unlike OPJs, normally lack coercive powers. Most
members of the national police and of the gendarmerie with more than one or two year's
experience are agents de la police judiciaire.
214. See Rivero, Deision du 12janvier 1977, 1978 A.J.D.A. 215, 215-16.
215. For general background on the origin and growth of the Constitutional Council, see
L. FAVOREU & L. PHILIP, LE CONSEIL CONSTITUTIONNEL: QUE SAIS-JE? (1978); F.
LUCHAIRE, LE CONSEIL CONSTITUTIONNEL (1980). The leading work in English is N. BRAD-
FORD, FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND JUDICIAL REVIEW IN FRANCE (1978). See also Beards-
ley, Constitutional Review in France, 1975 SUP. CT. REV. 189; Cappelletti, The "Mighty"
Problem of Judicial Review and the Contribution of Comparative Analysis, 53 S. CAL. L. REV.
409 (1979).
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to guide the legislature but were not considered to be judicially en-
forceable. Fear of government by judges led French Republicans to
deny the regular courts the authority to review the legality of executive
or legislative action. Thus, French courts traditionally could not de-
clare a statute unconstitutional.
The 1958 Constitution which founded the Fifth Republic broke
with that tradition by establishing a separate Constitutional Council.
That body's primary function was to protect the autonomous law-mak-
ing powers that the new Constitution conferred on the executive from
Parliamentary infringements. 216 The Council was to perform this func-
tion by determining the constitutionality of a law passed by Parliament
prior to its promulgation by the President of the Republic. For ordi-
nary laws, only the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister, or
the Presidents of the National Assembly or Senate could invoke the
jurisdiction of the Council.
The Council performed its primary function of protecting the ex-
ecutive from legislative encroachments in relative calm until 1971 when
for the first time it struck down a law because the law violated an indi-
vidual constitutional right (in this case the liberty of association).2 17 Al-
though the decision recognized the enforceability of a constitutional
right against the legislature, the Council acted not at the behest of an
individual who wished to exercise the right, but at the request of the
President of the Senate who had opposed the law's enactment. In the
years that followed, the Council held that other individual rights men-
tioned in the Preamble to the Constitution of 1958 were enforceable
against the legislature.218 The Council's role expanded further with the
adoption in 1974 of an amendment to the Constitution which allowed
sixty Deputies or sixty Senators to invoke the Council's jurisdiction to
determine whether a law conformed to the Constitution. This change
allowed the opposition to challenge the constitutionality of allegedly
repressive legislation sponsored by the government.219
216. Boulois, La defenseur de l'exkutif, 1980 POUVOIRs 27-34.
217. Judgment of July 16, 1971, Con. Const., 1972 D.S. Jur. 1 685, notedin L. FAVOREU &
L. PHILIP, LES GRANDES DCCIS1ONS DU CONSEIL CONSTITUTIONNEL 235 (2d ed. 1979).
218. L. Favoreu, Le conseil constitutionnel et laprotection de la Aibertl individuelle el de la
vieprivi'e, in I ETUDES OFFERTES A PIERRE KAYSER 411-25 (1979).
The Preamble to the Constitution of 1958 in turn adopted by reference the Preamble
to the Constitution of 1946 and the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen. Id.
219. By American standards, the Council's body of constitutional law is still quite unde-
veloped. The Council has had a limited number of opportunities to render decisions and
has had difficulty determining which constitutional provisions are judicially enforceable.
Further interpretative difficulties arise from the recognition in the Preamble to the Constitu-
tion of 1946 of the vague category of "Fundamental Principles Recognized by the Laws of
the Republic," which, once identified by the Council, are enforceable against the legislature.
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The Constitutional Council's 1977 decision declaring unconstitu-
tional the law authorizing unlimited vehicle searches was one of the
most striking examples of the Council's new role as a protector of indi-
vidual liberties. At the opposition's behest, the Council struck down a
major piece of legislation sponsored by the govermental majority as
part of its program to repress crime. The majority's acceptance of this
defeat demonstrated that judicial review of legislation for constitution-
ality has become an accepted part of French political life.22° The pres-
ence of this check on the legislature nevertheless is surprising to many
French jurists committed to the Republican tradition. It was only in
the course of its functioning over the years that the Council resolved
the initial ambiguity in the constitutional text whether the Council is
simply a super-legislature or is really a judicial body.22' The members
of the Council have earned a reputation as judges by acting like judges
in hearing legal arguments and in rendering reasoned decisions.
The limited impact of the Constitutional Council's decision on ve-
hicular searches derives not from the newness of the Council's ap-
proach or from doubts about the Council's legitimacy but from the
Council's jurisdiction as a court of revision. Although the Council may
declare a new law unconstitutional prior to its promulgation, neither a
public official nor an affected private individual may invoke the Coun-
cil's jurisdiction to determine the constitutionality of a law once it has
been promulgated by the President. Those laws therefore are invulner-
able to constitutional challenge; there is no way private litigants may
appeal from the regular courts to the Constitutional Council. Novel
questions therefore arise when the regular courts are asked to apply
statutory provisions, often promulgated before the existence of the
Constitutional Council or before its adoption of an approach that pro-
tected individual liberties, the constitutionality of which is doubtful
under the Council's more recent decisions.
The precedential effect of a decision of the Constitutional Council
Recently, the Council decided that the "rights of the defense" was a fundamental principle
of constitutional stature and declared unconstitutional the articles in the law "Security and
Liberty" that conferred discretionary authority on the president of the court to exclude sum-
marily from a trial an avocat whose "attitude compromised the serenity of the proceedings."
Philip, La d&cision sircuit et IibertM des 19 el 20janvier 1981, 1981 R.D.P. 651, 657-59, 682.
French jurists have been surprisingly gentle in their criticism of the Council's work.
The widely cited biannual commentaries by Louis Favoreu and Loic Philip in the Revue du
droitpublic are intended primarily to assist the Council in developing a body of a constitu-
tional law. For a more critical appraisal, see Logchak, Le conseil constitutionnel, protecteur
des ibertespubliques? 1980 POUVOIRs 7-15.
220. Rivero, Fin d'un absolutism, 1980 PouvolRs 7-15.
221. See generally Luchaire, Le conseil constitutionnel est-il unejuridiction? 1979 R.D.P.
27.
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can be viewed either restrictively or broadly. Article 62 of the Consti-
tution provides that the "decisions" of the Council are binding on pub-
lic officials and on all administrative and judicial authorities. The
binding effect plainly covers the dispositif portion of the Council's deci-
sion (i.e., the Council's declaration or judgment that the particular law
before it is unconstitutional), and, under the broad view, the decision's
binding effect extends also to the Council's motif or reasoning (e.g., the
breadth of the police power to search vehicles violated the motorist's
constitutional right to individual liberty), which provides the necessary
support for the disposition. If the restrictive view is the correct one, a
decision of the Constitutional Council invalidates only the law before
it. If the broad view is the correct one, the regular courts seemingly
must refuse to apply other statutory provisions similar in scope to the
law condemned by the Constitutional Council.
The supporters of the Constitutional Council have argued force-
fully for the expansive approach.222 In support of their position, they
have argued that the Cour de cassation recognizes the binding effect of
both the dispositive portion of its judgments and the underlying rea-
soning.223 The Cour de cassahion, however, has adopted this approach
only for purposes of determining the law of the case (the binding effect
of its judgment on the lower courts on the second remand of a case) or
of applying principles of res judicata when new litigation arises be-
tween the parties, not for the purpose of fashioning a rule of prece-
dent.224 The notion of a binding precedent is even more foreign to
French law than the notion of judicial review of legislation; the French
judges are not bound by what other judges have held in different cases
even if the latter judges are their judicial superiors.225
Given this background it is not surprising that the regular courts
have refused to recognize the binding effect of the reasoning in the de-
cisions of the Constitutional Council. In a 1974 decision, the Cour de
cassation adopted the position that under the French Constitution the
regular courts were bound by the law (i.e., the statute) and had to apply
it even though the reasoning of a decision of the Constitutional Council
222. See generally F. LUCHAIRE, LE CONSEIL CONSTITUTIONNEL (1980).
223. Id. at 48-49.
224. 1 J. GHESTIN & G. GOUBEAUX, TRAITt DE DROIT CIVIL 304-06, 436 (1977).
225. French judges nevertheless are aware of prior decisions and strive to achieve uni-
formity in interpreting Code provisions. With the help of the commentators (and also of a
computer data bank), they have developed in many areas well-established rules (Arispru-
dence constante). I J. GHESTIN & G. GOUBEAUX, TRAITE DE DROIT CIVIL 312-14, 326-27
(1977).
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would invalidate the law on constitutional grounds.226 This approach
is troublesome because it permits the application of unconstitutional
laws simply because no forum is available for challenging their consti-
tutionality. For example, a 1975 decision of the Constitutional Council
invalidated a law authorizing the trial of dits in a tribunal correction-
nel before a single judge rather than a three-judge panel." 7 Despite
this decision, thousands of defendants are tried each year in a tribunal
correctionnel before a single judge under a similar law enacted by Par-
liament in 1972 at the behest of the governmental majority.22 That
law escaped review by the Constitutional Council because there was no
way at that time for the opposition to invoke the Council's jurisdiction.
The Cour de cassation's approach notwithstanding, the tribunal
correctionnel that initally convicted Trignol adopted the unusual step
of distinguishing the proceeding before it from the vehicle searches
condemned by the Constitutional Council.2 9 To do so, the court cited
the Council's decision and paraphrased its language condemning the
breadth of the searches authorized by Parliament outside the context of
any official inquiry into an offense. The Constitutional Council had in
fact noted that the police power to search under the law which it found
unconstitutional did not depend on the commission of an offense. The
tribunal correctionnel relied on this language to argue that the Constitu-
tional Council's decision did not invalidate searches conducted during
an official inquiry but only condemned random, general searches
where the police were not investigating a particular offense. Thus, the
decision did not provide a basis for challenging the constitutionality of
the police power to search during an enquire deflagrance. Neither the
cour d'appel nor the Cour de cassation in Trignol's case repeated this
analysis, but in ruling that an OPJ properly could search Trignol's ve-
hicle during an enqubte deflagrance, they implicitly adopted the same
reasoning.
The reasoning of the tribunal correctionnel has considerable appeal
to a common-law lawyer accustomed to distinguishing precedents, es-
pecially precedents such as the Constitutional Council's invalidation of
the vehicle search law that are a court's first venture into a new area of
law. The French commentators were less favorably impressed and
226. Judgment of Feb. 26, 1974, Cass. crim., 1974 D.S. Jur. I 273 conclusions M.A. Touf-
fait, note R. Vouin.
227. Judgment of July 23, 1975, Con. const., 1977 D.S. Jur. I 629 note L. Hamon & G.
Levasseur.
228. 2 MERLE & VITU, supra note 39, at 592.
229. For a summary of the text of the tribunal correctionners decision, see Rivero, Di-
sion du 12janvier 1977, 1978 A.J.D.A. 215, 218.
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condemned the decisions of the nonconstitutional courts in Trignol for
interpreting the statutory provisions on the authority of the police dur-
ing an enquete deflagrance so broadly as to permit the same random,
arbitrary searches condemned by the Constitutional Council.23 ° There
is force to this argument, but ultimately it sweeps too far. As shown in
this article, in many areas the judicial police or an examining magis-
trate enjoy broad investigatory powers unchecked by notions of prob-
able cause or individual liberties. These powers derive from the official
inquiry model and from the Code provisions formalizing that model
without placing effective limits on it. The reasoning of the Constitu-
tional Council, with its emphasis on individual liberties, is more consis-
tent with the American approach, but to impose that approach on the
French criminal justice system would be inconsistent with that system's
structure. Perhaps the legislature should opt for those changes, but it is
unrealistic to expect the regular courts to change the entire system on
their own.23'
CONCLUSION
This study of the French criminal justice system has focused pri-
marily on the balance achieved within the system between individual
rights and state authority. The rise and fall of competing politiques
criminelles or ideologies for combating crime has influenced the bal-
ance struck, but that balance has remained remarkably stable over
time. French police, prosecutors, and examining magistrates have
greater authority to detain, to interrogate, and to search than do Ameri-
can law enforcement officials; and individual Frenchmen have fewer
rights, when confronted with assertions of investigatory authority, than
persons in this country at the present time. On the other hand, the
rights of the French criminal defendant at trial compare favorably with
230. See the authorities cited supra notes 205, 207 and 210, especially Rivero, Dicision du
12janvier 1977, 1978 A.J.D.A. 215.
23 1. A 1980 decision of the Constitutional Council accentuated the conflict between the
constitutional rights recognized by the Council and the statutory provisions applied by the
regular courts in criminal cases. Judgment of Jan. 9, 1980, Con. const., 1980 D.S. Jur. 1 249
note J. Auby; Judgment of Jan. 9, 1980, Con. const., 1980 G.P. Jur. II 532 note L. Hamon.
In that case, the Council held unconstitutional a statutory provision approved by the Parlia-
ment authorizing a seven-day administrative detention of aliens facing expulsion, on the
grounds that it violated article 60 of the 1958 Constitution, which recognizes the judiciary as
the guardian of individual liberty. At the same time the Council upheld a statutory provi-
sion authorizing a two-day administrative detention of aliens rejected at the frontier. This
decision of the Constitutional Council provides a constitutional basis for challenging the
police garde d vue. Once again, however, defendants before the regular courts who seek to
challenge the garde - vue will encounter difficulties so long as those courts refuse to apply
the Constitutional Council's individual rights model.
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those of the American defendant. In particular, the court controls the
disposition of the case, and the defendant is not subject to pressure
from the prosecutor to forego his trial rights in order to secure more
lenient punishment.232
This article has criticized the scope of the state's investigatory au-
thority in France and the usurpation of that formerly judicial power by
the prosecutor and the police. The authority of the police (and of the
examining magistrate) to detain individuals for purposes of investiga-
tion and to search without probable cause seems excessive from the
j)erspective of effective law enforcement and harmful to the individ-
ual's liberty. The widespread police practice of incommunicado inter-
rogation of counselless suspects also appears to give the state too much
of an advantage over the individual. On the other hand, the trial stage
of the process has received less attention (and praise) in this article than
many readers may think it deserves. But the trial does not play the
same central role in France as it does in this country in those cases
where the defendant denies his guilt. Although in France all cases go
to trial, there is a certain element of anticlimax to the trial because the
dossier usually shapes its course and determines its outcome. The
rights enjoyed by the defendant at trial are substantial but are of lesser
importance to the ordinary citizen than the more modest and often in-
adequate protection afforded individuals at the earlier investigatory
stage.
For these reasons the balance struck by the American system
seems to be the preferable one. Our system is not perfect, but neither is
the French. Perhaps the best justification for studying the French sys-
tem is that it gives us a perspective from which to appreciate the
strengths of our own system.
232. The Socialists' victories in the elections of May and June, 1981, are unlikely to
change the balance significantly. After more than a year's vacillation, the new Socialist
government finally introduced legislation to repeal portions of the much-abused law "Secur-
ity and Liberty." Le Monde, July 25-26, 1982, at 5. The legislation, which is likely to pass
both houses of Parliament by the end of the year, primarily repeals the prior law's punish-
ment provisions but retains largely intact the procedural provisions on identity checks and
on the summary prosecution of diits. The Socialists therefore have done very little so far to
affect the basic characteristics of the system. While there is some talk of a more radical
rewriting of the Code of Criminal Procedure to afford greater protection to the individual,
the continued public concern over security, especially from terrorist attacks, and the govern-
ment's focus on the country's economic crisis, make it unlikely that the Socialist Parliament
will be active in this area.
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